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ABSTRACT
THE GOOD VERSUS THE APPREHENSIVE SUBJECT: THE EFFECT5
OF HYPOTHESIS AWARENES5 AND EVALUATION APPREHENSION 
ON COMPLIANCE WITH MANIPULATED DEMAND 
CHARACTERISTICS OF A CONDITIONING 
EXPERIMENT
by
DEBORAH H. DU NANN
The dissertation reports research designed to test 
the relative importance of two subject motivations in a 
typical laboratory experiment. To investigate whether sub­
jects are more concerned about helping the experimenter 
verify his predictions or presenting themselves positively, 
several procedural manipulations were made which affected 
subjects' hypothesis and evaluation awareness of the 
experiment.
In order to investigate the role of cooperation with 
these demand characteristics, several relationships between 
data and variables were examined. The first involved the 
effect of these manipulations on post-experimental reports 
of awareness, the second involved the effects of these 
manipulations on conditioning, and the third involved 
the relationship between awareness reports and
ix
conditioning. In this manner, a triangulation of obser­
vations was made to provide an extensive picture of how 
a subject responds in the classical conditioning of attitudes 
experiment, and what sorts of processes underlie his/her 
cooperation
Data concerning the effects of the cue manipulations 
on awareness indicated both convergent and discriminant 
validity of the hypothesis and evaluation cues. The 
resulting conditioning showed that both types of subject 
roles depend upon a complex interaction of the various cues 
available in the situation and individual characteristics 
of the subject. Both cooperation and apprehension was 
observed, and subjects' need for social approval enhanced 
the effectiveness of the evaluation cues while it decreased 
the effectiveness of the hypothesis cue. Post-experimental 
awareness measures indicated that hypothesis awareness was 
essential in mediating the effects of the evaluation cues, 
but that predictions derived from a model of conscious 
propositional control were not verified.
Recommendations from the study point to the need 
for experimental psychologists working with human subjects 
to consider awareness reports when interpreting their 
studies, to minimize the possibility of cues which produce 
hypothesis and evaluation awareness, to concern themselves 
less with the relative importance of subject "roles" and 
to begin specifying precise situational events which elicit 
or supress compliance, and thereby extend the present
research to other experimental paradigms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although experimental psychology is marked by con­
siderable diversity of assumptions among its practitioners, 
there are two basic assumptions which, while usually not 
verbalized, are critical to its scientific status. They are 
1) that variables which are manipulated in the laboratory are 
specifiable, and 2) that the phenomena observed there can be 
generalized in some way to non-laboratory conditions. These 
are essential assumptions, without which the science of 
behavior would be useless, if not impossible. The laboratory, 
then, has often been assumed to be a neutral surrounding, 
enabling the manipulation and control of specified stimuli, 
as well as the prediction and measurement of resulting 
behavior.
There has been in recent years, however, a growing 
doubt as to the general legitimacy of this model for the 
study of human behavior. Unlike the experiments in classical 
physics, after which experimental psychology has self­
consciously modeled itself, the central object of psychologi­
cal study, the behaving organism, cannot be placed in a 
vacuum condition which stands unaffected by the particular 
experimental situation. This notion has been expressed for 
many years (Koch, 1959; Rosensweig, 1933) but a recent surge 
of empirical activity has emerged to make the social psy­
chology of the experiment an important concern of the 1970's
2(Adair, 1 973; Friedman, 1 967; Miller, 1 972; Rosenthal &.
Rosnow, 1969). In this manner, experimental psychology is 
beginning to resemble more contemporary physics in which 
random variables have come to be considered as fixed vari­
ables, and psychologists are expanding their conception of 
relevant predictors of behavior, namely laboratory effects.
Several distinct areas of research have been born in 
this regard. For example, Robert Rosenthal (1966) has amassed 
substantial evidence that the experimenter exerts powerful 
effects, through subtle means, on the subjects' behavior by 
merely possessing an expectation about the effect an experi­
mental condition should have. While some of his research has 
received cogent methodological criticism (Barber & Silver,
1 9 68), it is generally acknowledged (Adair, 1 973 ; Fishbein &. 
Ajzen, 1972; Miller, 1972; Kessel, 1971) that the experimenter 
can be a potent source of artifact, and research into the 
effects of experimenter expectations continues to flourish 
(for example, Adair, 1 973 ; Bloom &. Tesser, 1971; Duncan, 
Rosenberg, &. Finkelstein, 1 969 ; Friedman, 1 967; Harris, 1971; 
Rosenberg, 1973; Sattler, 1970).
Other programs of research have centered on the 
special nature of volunteer subjects (Rosenthal &. Rosnow,
1 969 ; Rosnow &. Rosenthal, 1970) on the methodological con­
founds produced by deception (Brock &. Becker, 1 966 ; Cook,
Bean, C.ilder, Frey, &. Krovetz, 1 970) on special cues in the 
experiment which tell subjects what is expected of them 
(Orne, 1962; 1968; 1969) and on laboratory-produced motiva-
3tions and defenses on the part of subjects (Rosenberg, 1965,
1 969). Reviews of research on these topics have recently 
been collected in a volume by Rosenthal and Rosnow (eds.) 
entitled Artifact in Behavioral Research.
The title of this book indicates the current status 
of these social psychological events in the laboratory: 
they are considered dangerous confounding variables which 
infect the true phenomena under study. In this vein, Silver­
man and 5chulman (1970), for example, have outlined some of 
their effects in laboratory studies of attitude change and 
have made several suggestions for future research on the basis 
of their findings. The first is that experimenters should 
make better attempts to disguise the true purpose of their 
studies by increasing the quality and quantity of deception 
procedures. The second is that more studies should be con­
ducted outside the laboratory, in non-reactive settings 
(Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, &. Sechrest, 1 966). These two pro­
cedures would apparently reduce the likelihood that the sub­
ject would respond to the specific social stimuli of the 
laboratory rather than to the inferred independent variable.
While these recommendations seem reasonable and would 
certainly solve some of the problems described, strict 
adherence to these solutions would leave most of the issues 
far from solved. First of all, changing the nature and 
increasing the intensity of deception procedures raises 
serious ethical issues (Baumrind, 1964; Kelman, 1967) as well 
as substantial methodological problems, as demonstrated in
4the recent work on deception and suspiciousness (Allen, 1966; 
Cook et al. , 1 970; McGuire, 1 969; Strieker, Messick &. Jack­
son, 1969). It is likely that increased deception creates 
heightened suspiciousness, which then necessitates more 
deception, etc., eventuating in an endless spiral of lies and 
deceit, a polluted subject pool, and biased data. While the 
second recommendation, that of field studies, would certainly 
bypass some of these problems, such settings are frequently 
impossible for well-controlled investigations. Thus, there 
seems little way of avoiding the social nature of psychologi­
cal research.
A more promising approach would seem to be to attack 
these problems directly by attempting to discover various 
situational antecedents in the laboratory which give rise to 
these artifacts. In this context, the artifact then becomes 
a legitimate topic of study in its own right. Noting that 
it is the wise researcher who realizes that at any given time 
one man's artifact may be another man's main effect, McGuire 
(1969) has traced the history of artifacts through three 
stages. They are 1) ignorance, when the artifact contaminates 
the research without the experimenter's knowledge; 2) coping, 
during which the experimenter becomes over-concerned and 
diverted in trying to control for it and eliminate it from 
his studies; and 3) exploitation, when the researcher recog­
nizes the artifact as an interesting phenomenon in itself 
and designs studies to investigate the underlying processes. 
Thus, while much recent research has been primarily of stage
5♦
2, it seems time to move to stage 3.
This would be particularly the case with phenomena 
which we would expect to have generalizability to non- 
laboratory conditions. That is, artifacts generated by 
strictly-laboratory stimuli, such as special equipment, 
would be much less interesting than artifacts generated by 
social-psychological phenomena, like the subject's response 
to perceived expectancies. In this respect, the study of the 
experiment from the point of view of the subject is likely 
to result in the understanding of social processes which go 
far beyond the laboratory. To be sure, the subject is in a 
special situation--an experiment— but he brings to the experi­
ment motives and attitudes which he is likely to bring to 
other social-contract situations that have properties in 
common with the psychological experiment.
Actually, the human subject is really the chief con­
cern of all artifact study, for all of these artifacts bias 
data by affecting subjects. In order to study any social 
psychological aspects of the experiment, we must know more 
about how subjects perceive it, what sorts of cues they use 
to make inferences about it, and what sorts of conditions 
cause the various subject motivations.
The Human 5ubject— Subject of Controversy 
This concern with the subject and his experience in 
the laboratory represents an interesting synthesis of his­
toric themes in experimental psychology. As Schultz (1969) 
has noted, since the days when the Functionalist and Behav­
6ioristic movements in the United States helped demote the 
human subject from the lofty position he enjoyed in Wundt's 
and Titchener's laboratories, the human subject has been 
seen as a passive input-output machine. His role was to 
passively and naively be subjected to stimuli and to 
reflexively respond to them (Boring, 1953). His very name, 
"subject,” reflects this designation, and it differs sig­
nificantly from Wundt's "reagent" who took a more active 
and sophisticated role in describing the effects of stimuli 
upon his consciousness.
The attention to social aspects of the laboratory, 
however, points to the need for us to consider the subject as 
something more than a naive and passive body. Now he is being 
conceptualized as actively engaged in a problem-solving task 
when he enters the experiment. He is not merely subjected 
to stimuli, but he is consciously trying to discern what is 
going on in the experiment, what the experimenter is trying 
to demonstrate, what the expected behavior means, and whether 
he should respond accordingly.
While some aspects of this position may have been 
overstated to represent a currently-fashionable humanistic 
concern with the importance of the subject, the recent 
attention to the phenomenological viewpoint of the subject 
represents an interesting communion of two formerly opposing 
camps in contemporary psychology (5chultz, 1969). On the 
one hand, the strict experimentalist has traditionally been 
rooted in the behavioristic tradition, and has thus been more
7concerned with overt behavior than mediating mental pro­
cesses. He has been in sharp contrast with the more recently 
emerging humanistic camp of psychologists who place great 
importance on the person’s phenomenological perspective, and 
insist that analysis of overt behavior is at best incomplete 
without an exploration into the human being's phenomenologi­
cal perspective, his awareness, feelings, ideas, goals, etc. 
(Jourard, 1967; 1968). Traditionally, these approaches to 
the study of human behavior have been divided along experi­
mental vs. clinical boundaries, but now it seems possible to 
unite both the experimentalists' need for objectivity with 
the phenomenologists' regard for immediate experience, 
through the laboratory study of behavior and awareness. In 
this manner, experimental psychology would seem to be evolving 
in a spiral (Kuhn, 1962) with regard to the older Functionalist- 
Structuralist debate (Baldwin, 1895) as to who our subjects 
should be and how they should be studied. That is, rather 
than swinging back to the earlier opposite of behaviorism 
(that of using trained introspectionsists as subjects) we are 
moving forward to the inclusion of both phenomenological 
reports and overt behavior as converging sources of data.
Recent Formulations of Subject Reactions 
Subject motivations have been long recognized as 
potential sources of bias (Rosensweig, 1933; Titchener, 1895).
In non-laboratory settings, for example, the Hawthorne 
studies demonstrated that just being in an experiment pro-
aduces special motivation on the part of workers which make 
it difficult to surmise inferences about the effects of 
environmental stimuli such as lightning since any environ­
mental change produced better performance. Presumably the 
special attention was more important than the independent 
variables which the psychologists were studying (Roethlis- 
berger &. Dickson, 1 937).
In large part, however, recent attention to the social 
aspects of the laboratory experiment was stimulated by Martin 
□rne's (1962) suggestion that human subjects come into labo­
ratories seeking to discover what it is that is expected of 
them. Actively trying to discern the experimenter's expecta­
tions, subjects search for and respond to demand characteris­
tics, which Orne defined as "the totality of cues which con­
vey an experimental hypothesis." Broadly conceptualized, 
these cues were said to include
the rumors or campus scuttlebutt about the research, the 
information conveyed during the original solicitation, 
the person of the experimenter, and the setting of the 
laboratory, as well as all explicit and implicit communi­
cations during the experiment proper [p. 779].
According to Drne, what makes these demand charac­
teristics so pernicious to valid psychological research is 
that subjects are by nature motivated to help the scientist 
with his work in furthering scientific knowledge. That is, 
subjects want to be "good" subjects: they come into the
laboratory concerned about having their data be valid and 
useful; they willingly comply with the experimenter's 
requests so that they can give the responses he is looking
9for; and in attempting to cooperate with the experimenter, 
they actively search for cues which will give them some idea 
as to how they are supposed to behave in the experimental 
situation. With this kind of motivation on the part of the 
subjects, it is quite possible what the behavior experi- 
menters observe is as much or more a function of this active 
problem solving by subjects as it is a result of the experi­
menter’s conceptualization of the independent variables.
To illustrate the cooperative and complacent nature 
of the typical human subject, Drne describes his attempts to 
find a task so boring and ridiculous that subjects would 
refuse to do it. In one study he asked them to do a long 
series of addition problems which would obviously be impossi­
ble to complete within the day, and then to tear each sheet 
up as soon as it was finished. Subjects worked diligently at 
this job for several hours, until the experimenter finally 
gave up! Post-experimental interviews with the subjects 
revealed that they had (correctly) inferred that the experi­
menter must have had some legitimate reason for assigning 
such a task (i.e., many thought it was some sort of endurance 
test). In other studies (Orne &. Evans, 1 965), Orne describes 
subjects who would apparently do dangerous things like pick 
up a poisonous snake or a penny from fuming nitric acid,
1
simply because the experimenter had asked them to do it. In 
these ways, Orne's formulation seems quite viable.
1
The analagous observation of Milgram in the contro­
versial obediance research (Milgram, 1965) is also demonstra­
tive. Here subjects were told to administer shocks to a 
"victim" so severe that they thought they might have killed
1 □
Empirical Evidence for the Good-Subject Role
In general, there is widespread support for the 
notion that something like the process which Orne describes 
is part of the experimental situation, in that evidence for 
the good-subject role comes from a number of fields of 
research employing a variety of paradigms. The most clear 
demonstration of cooperative motivation is found in studies 
in which prior explicit information about the experimenter's 
expectations (usually by a confederate acting as another sub­
ject who has just finished the experiment) increases compli­
ance with these expectations. For example, Levy (1967) had 
confederates inform subjects of the correct purpose of a 
Taffel-conditioning task (". . . you have to sit there and
make up sentences using these words she has on a card and it 
seems she wantsyou to make up sentences using I or We as the 
pronoun . . . [p. 369]"). Subjects informed of this pro­
duced about one and one-half times more of the correct 
responses than did uninformed subjects. Levy's results have 
been replicated recently (Goldstein, Rosnow, Goodstadt &.
Suls, 1 973; Smith, Helm, &. Tedeschi, 1 972) providing further 
support for the good subject in this paradigm.
A confederate was also the source of prior informa­
tion in a study of the autokinetic effect (Alexander,
Zucker &. Brody, 1 970) where the naive subject "accidently" 
overheard another (the confederate) being run through the
him— yet, most subjects complied with the request.
experiment. This source of information about how much con­
vergence was expected, together with other information 
directly delivered by the experimenter, was found to have 
considerable effect on the judgments of the real subjects.
This provides additional evidence that subjects try to do
what is expected of them, particularly when other cues to the
correct response are ambiguous, as in an autokinetic pro­
cedure .
In a variety of other studies, strong support for the
good subject has been demonstrated by the manipulation of
cues which apparently increase the saliency of the experi­
menter's expectation, followed by a corresponding increase in 
cooperation with the hypothesis. For example, in a sensory- 
deprivation study, Orne and Schiebe (1964) found that the 
presence of a "panic button" produced hampered motor perfor­
mance, as well as more reports of unusual experiences on the 
part of subjects than subjects not exposed to this cue. 
Similarly, Page and 5cheidt (1971) varied the degree to which 
the presence of a weapon was pointed out, and found that sub­
jects appeared much more aggressive under the high-salience 
condition (in line with their perception of the experimenter's 
expectations regarding the cue) than did subjects in the low- 
salience condition. Several other demonstrations like these 
have been reported with attitude-change studies. For 
example, Silverman (1968) found more attitude change from a 
classroom of subjects when he indicated that they were 
involved in a psychological experiment than when he intro­
duced the experimental task as part of a survey. In 
another study, Silverman (Silverman & Regula, 1968) found that 
subjects changed their attitude more in line with a message 
when a distraction (static on the tape subjects were listen­
ing to) was described as accidental. Apparently, subjects 
in the first condition assumed that the experiment was a test 
of their powers to concentrate and showed better attention 
than did the later subjects, again demonstrating that sub­
jects try to do their best to live up to the experimenter's 
expectations. In other attitude-change studies, Rosnow 
(Rosnow & 5uls, 1970; Rosnow, Holpner & Gitter, 1973) has 
shown that the use of a pre-test, in blatant form, enhances 
the good-subject role by communicating to subjects the notion 
of what the experimenter expects. Likewise the salience of 
the experimenter's expectations was manipulated by Rosnow, 
Rosenthal, McConochie, and Arms (1969) by presenting one­
sided versus two-sided communications. The increased atti­
tude change in the one-sided condition was interpreted as 
being due to the experimenter's expectations being much more 
transparent there. Finally, two conformity studies show that 
at times subjects might even risk looking irrational to please 
the experimenter. For instance, Bruehl and 5olar (1970) 
varied the behavior of a confederate and found that conformity 
was greatest among those subjects who knew that the experi­
menter expected conformity. Similar results were reported by 
Adair (1972) in the description of a study by Allen (1966)
1 3
who found that conformity was greatest among subjects who were 
suspicious about the experimenter's hypothesis.
□f course, the strongest evidence comes from studies 
where cues are actually manipulated to increase awareness so 
the effect of this awareness on subject cooperation can be 
studied. But a number of suggestive findings from correla­
tional studies also converge to support the notion that sub­
jects try to help the experimenter find what they think he 
is looking for. In these studies, awareness is measured 
after the experiment, and the correlation between awareness 
and behavior is an indication of cooperation.
For example, in a figure-ground perception task,
Page (1968) showed that subjects in a Schafer and Murphy per­
ception task (5chaf er &. Murphy, 1 943) perceived both aspects 
of an ambiguous figure, but subjects picked the portion which 
they thought the experimenter expected them to pick. Simi­
larly, on a pursuit-motor task, subjects who thought the trials 
should improve performance did better than those who thought 
the trials should increase fatigue (Adair, 1970, reported in 
Adair, 1973). Page (1970) has also demonstrated that the 
typical communicator-credib-ility experiment is probably 
mediated by the good-subject role. When subjects read a 
message by a prestigious author, they were much more aware 
that the experimenter expected change, and they changed 
accordingly. Those subjects unaware of this hypothesis did 
not change. Subjects in a low-credibility condition (non- 
prestigious source) changed much less and were much less 
aware that the experimenter expected change (in line with
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the actual expectations of the experimenter!).
Within this correlational methodology, a lengthy 
and complex controversy has enveloped many researchers 
studying verbal conditioning concerning the question of whe­
ther awareness of the correct reinforcement contingency is 
necessary for learning in the verbal-conditioning tasks of 
Taffel (1955) and Greenspoon (1955). Much of this contro­
versy is centered on the many findings in which conditioning 
is highly correlated with post-experimental assessments of 
awareness of the correct contingency and experimenter expecta­
tions (Farber, 1963; Dulaney, 1962, 1968; Spielberger, 1962). 
Many agree now that it is unlikely that this controvery will 
ever be settled by empirical means (Greenspoon &. Brownstein, 
1968), probably because a crucial test is unlikely (Page, 
1973); but the many studies in which awareness and condition­
ing are highly correlated (DeNike &. 5pielberger, 1 963 ;
Kennedy &. Cormier, 1971 ; Monday, 1 968 ; Page, 1 967; Page &. 
Lumia, 1 968; Spielberger, DeNike, &. Stein, 1 965; DeNike,
1964; Dulaney, 1961, etc.) provide additional suggestive evi­
dence for the good-subject role. In other studies with the 
paradigm, Holmes (1967) and Page (1970) have provided further 
evidence by showing that both awareness and conditioning are 
greater among subjects who have had more experience in psy­
chology courses. This suggests that sophistication in psy­
chology leads to awareness, which in turn produces more con­
ditioning because the subject is motivated to help the experi­
menter and do what is expected of him. The same increase in
awareness and conditioning has also been found among volun­
teer as opposed to nonvolunteer subjects (Goldstein, et al.,
1972).
In addition to the experimental and correlational 
investigations, a few other studies suggest more indirectly 
that Qrne was correct, even though no manipulations or mea­
sures of awareness were performed. For example, Rosnow 
(1968) has suggested that demand characteristics may be 
responsible for the one-sided versus two-sided message effect. 
In a two-sided condition, subjects moved toward an anti­
fraternity stand presumably because they thought this would 
be the position held by the faculty communicator. In the 
one-sided message condition, the expectations were apparently 
more clear, and subjects moved in the direction of the message. 
In a study of psychophysics (Juhasz &. Sarbin, 1 966) in which 
subjects were given distilled water and asked to give judg­
ments of whether they tasted salt in the solutions, 83 per­
cent of the subjects have at least one salt response, even 
though all solutions were distilled water. In a similar 
vein, Jacoby, Olson and Haddock (1971) found that subjects 
rated brand name beer samples according to expectations, 
even though the samples were all of the same beer. It is 
this sort of mounting evidence, both correlational and experi­
mental, from a wide variety of paradigms, that have led many 
to doubt the interpretability of much of psychological 
research, from some studies concerned with cognitive pro­
cesses (Neisser, 1967) to the treatment of insomnia (Eiseman,
1970), all on the basis of the good-subject role.
Other Roles
The evidence would seem to suggest that Orne was 
indeed correct and that subjects are unquestionably compliant 
in their response to cues which suggest an experimental 
hypothesis. However, not all researchers find that their 
subjects are so concerned with helping the experimenter. In 
fact, it has been suggested that there are some aspects 
about Orne, his laboratory, and his research that would give 
rise to an unusually large number of good subjects: first,
he has been largely concerned with studying hypnosis, which 
is itself a somewhat cooperative process; secondly, he pri­
marily used volunteer subjects who travel considerable dis­
tances in order to be in his research (Adair, 1973). There 
is a large amount of empirical evidence that volunteers are 
more perceptive and cooperative in an experimental situation 
than are non-volunteers (Goldstein, et al. , 1 972; Hood &. 
Back, 1971; Horowitz & Gumenik, 1970; Rosenthal, 1965; 
Rosenthal &, Rosnow, 1 969; Rosnow &, Rosenthal, 1 970; Rosnow &. 
Rosenthal, 1 966; Rosnow &. Suls, 1 970; Rosnow &. Aiken, 1 973). 
Third, Orne has been described by his colleagues as an 
excellent researcher who takes great care in preparing his 
subjects (Adair, 1973) as well as possessing a dynamic per­
sonality and distinguished style which would enhance any 
cooperative inclination on the part of a subject (Shor, 
personal communication, 1972).
In contrast to Orne's formulation, others have 
described subjects who appear quite differentthan the "good 
subject." In fact, some have suggested that subjects will 
sometimes go out of their way to behave opposite to what 
they think the experimenter is hypothesizing. The comments 
regarding this "negativistic" role are not as clearly inte­
grated as those regarding the good-subject role, and empiri­
cal evidence for it is even more scanty, but for various 
reasons these subjects have been designated as "recalcitrant 
(Fillenbaum &. Frey, 1 970), and "negativistic" (Cook, et al. , 
1970), and the effects have been (rather indelicately) 
labelled the "screw you effect" (Masling, 1966) as well as 
the "boomerang effect" (Silverman, 1965). Speculation as 
to what causes negativism has ranged from the fact that sub­
jects generally dislike situations in which they are treated 
as low-level employeees (Argyris, 1968), that some subjects 
generally dislike experimental psychologists who attempt to 
manipulate them (Goldberg, 1965); that subjects dislike 
being forced to do experiments (Cox &. Sipprelle, 1971; Black 
Schumpert, &. Welch, 1 972) ; that they actively try to avoid 
situations with lessened freedom (Brehm, 1 966; Resnick &. 
Schwartz, 1973), and that certain experimental treatments 
such as frustration can produce negativism (Silverman &. 
Kleinman, 1967). It also appears that, if certain role 
expectations on the part of experimenters are violated, sub­
jects become more uncooperative, such as in a recent study 
by Epstein, 5uedfield, and Silverstein (1973) which showed
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increased subject negativism when the experimenter was late 
for unexplained reasons.
While the proportion of negativistic subjects appears 
to be smaller, empirical evidence is growing that at least a 
small subsample of subjects do not necessarily follow the 
experimenter's expectations when they become aware of them. 
Aside from the experimental treatments of frustration, 
restricted freedom/ and deception (Silverman, Schulman &, 
Weisenthal, 1 970; Strieker, Messick &. Jackson, 1 967) which 
have been shown to decrease subject cooperation with the 
experimenter's expectations, a number of studies have shown 
that even without these sorts of treatments, not all subjects 
who are aware of the experimenter's expectation do cooperate. 
For instance, in the many studies which demonstrate the high 
correlation between subject awareness and conditioning in 
both verbal and classical-conditioning paradigms (DeMike,
1 964; DeNike &. Spielberger, 1 963; Dulaney, 1961; Holmes, 1 967; 
Kennedy &. Cormier, 1971; Monday, 1 968 ; Page, 1 968, 1 969,
1970; Page & Lumia, 1968; Spielberger, 1962; Spielberger, 
DeNike &, Stein, 1 965), not all aware subjects do condition.
In general, the literature suggests that the inci­
dence of the cooperation far outnumbers the negativism, as, 
for example, the study by Kennedy and Cormier (1971) which 
showed that only 5 out of their 108 subjects were highly 
aware of the contingencies and hypothesis, but had negative 
behavioral intentions and negative pre-experimental attitudes 
toward experimental psychology. While the number is not
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great, it appeared to these researchers to provide incipient
fulfillment of Rosenthal's (1966) prophesy that a
trend may be materializing where subjects, more knowl- 
edgable about classic research than preceding genera­
tions, are determined to show experimenters that they 
are not one of those "mindless acquiescers which instruc­
tors of elementary psychology courses are likely to 
teach about" [p. 11, 1966].
The importance of subject motivation to cooperate in the 
verbal-conditioning paradigm, and the wide opportunity for 
it to be decreased by interpersonal variables, is also shown 
in a lengthy review by Kessel and Barber (1968) of the vari­
ous interpersonal treatments which lowers subject motivations, 
such as unrewarding prior interaction and perceived dissimi­
larity between the experimenter and subject (Sapolsky, 1960).
Other research suggests that mere information about 
the experiment decreases rather than increases conformity 
(Adair, 1 972 ; Glinski, Glinski, &. Slatten, 1 970; Horowitz &. 
Rothchild, 1970). While a satisfactory explanation of the 
contradictory findings remains to be adequately resolved, it 
has been suggested (Adair, 1972) that the effect which infor­
mation will have depends upon the subject's perception of 
the conformity as being irrational dependency or good-natured 
cooperation. That the effect of information in the conformity 
paradigm is complex is also demonstrated by another study by 
Gallo, Smith and Mumford (1973) where either complete or 
partial information produced no differences from a group with 
no information. What it is about the different procedures 
and information in these studies which produces these dis­
crepant effects across laboratories remains an important
2D
problem to be solved, but it would seem that Adair's sug­
gestion would provide a good lead. This notion underscores 
the subject's perception as an important link between the 
independent variable and the dependent variable in the 
laboratory study, as well as emphasizes the importance of 
evaluation apprehension, a topic to which we now turn.
Evaluation Apprehension and the Defensive Subject
The suggestion that the effects of cues in the situa­
tion on subject cooperation depends upon the evaluation of 
cooperative behavior as to its socially-desirable or unde­
sirable qualities brings us to the third often cited subject 
role. This role is based on Rosenberg's (1965) notion of 
evaluation apprehension, which is defined as "an anxiety- 
toned concern [on the part of a subject] that he win a posi­
tive evaluation from the experimenter, or at least that he 
provide no grounds for a negative one [p. 29]."
Rosenberg's explicit formulation is recent, but the 
notion that people are very much concerned with putting their 
best foot forward or presenting themselves in a socially- 
desirable manner during a testing situation has been with us 
for some time (Edwards.., 1 957; Reicken, 1 962; Rosensweig, 
1933). Indeed, many of our deception procedures such as 
cover stories, filler items, and lie scales manifest psy­
chologists' beliefs that, if given the opportunity, the sub­
ject will conceal or exhibit, exaggerate or belittle those 
qualities he believes will be positively or negatively
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appraised in an experiment. This role, that of the appre­
hensive subject, has been considered as probably the most 
important one by a number of researchers (Berkowitz, 1971; 
Silverman, 1 968; Weber &. Cook, 1972) and so a description of 
its original inception is given at this point.
Evaluation apprehension was originally proposed by 
Rosenberg (1965) as an alternative explanation to a classic 
experiment in cognitive dissonance (Cohen, 1962) in which 
subjects were offered various monetary rewards to write a 
counter-attitudinal essay. In line with the prediction from 
dissonance theory that the most attitude change would occur 
under conditions with least"external'justification, the stu­
dents offered a small amount were more positive in their 
appraisal than were those given a large amount.
To Rosenberg, however, it seemed more plausible that, 
rather than creating differential levels of cognitive disso­
nance, what the independent variable of monetary amount did 
was to create different levels of evaluation apprehension. 
According to this view, the large reward offered to the sub­
ject in the low-dissonance condition aroused his suspicion 
that his honesty in resisting bribery was being tested. The 
subject, in Rosenberg's words, would be likely to reason that 
the experimenters
. . probably want to see whether getting paid so 
much will affect my own attitude, whether it will influ­
ence me, whether I am the kind of person whose views can 
be changed by buying him off." The subject who has formu­
lated such a subjective hypothesis about the real purpose 
of the experimental situation will be prone to resist 
giving evidence of attitude change: for to do so would,
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as he perceives it, convey something unattractive about 
himself, would lead to his being negatively evaluated 
by the experimenter [p. 2B6, 1969]|.
When Rosenberg replicated the Cohen study, but sepa­
rated the dissonance and measurement procedures by making the 
attitude survey and essay writing appear to be parts of two 
different experiments, the opposite effect was found. That 
is, subjects who were paid the most money showed the most 
agreement with the counter-attitudinal statements. Thus it 
appears that the original data were produced by an artifact 
of elicited evaluation apprehension, and when such appre­
hension was minimized, the "dissonance effect" was not found.
The Rosenberg re-explanation of the dissonance study 
has received the attention and controversy one might expect 
(e.g., Cook, 1969 ; Jones, Cooper, Carlsmith, Collins, &. 
Helmreich, 1966; Linder, Cooper, &. Jones, 1967) and failures 
of others to replicate the Rosenberg findings have produced 
even more complexities (see, for example, Jones &. Gerard,
1967, pp. 494-496 on when commitment occurs). However, for 
the purposes of the present discussion, what is important is 
the formulation of evaluation apprehension as a primary con­
cern of human subjects in the laboratory and its resulting 
effects on behavior.
A recent study by Alexander and Knight (1971) seems 
to provide some additional empirical support for evaluation 
apprehension as a mediator between the experimental situatioon 
of the dissonance study and the eventuating behavior as 
proposed by Rosenberg. The Alexander and Knight study was
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essentially an interpersonal simulation (Bern, 1967) of the 
experiment, in that Alexander and Knight's subjects listened 
to a tape recorded description of a typical subject who was 
described through the procedures of a dissonance study by 
Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) in which subjects were given 
various amounts for lying about an experiment to another sub­
ject. When the Alexander and Knight subjects were asked to 
make character inferences about a typical subject who did 
change his attitude in the high-reward condition, they 
supported Rosenberg's arguement by seeing him as less honest 
and more materialistic than a subject who changed his attitude 
in the low-reward condition. Thus Alexander and Knight 
concluded that it was very plausible that the subjects in 
the original study were behaving such that their "concern 
to maximize desirable identity impressions determined the 
dependent variable . . . [pp. 74-75]."
Other studies have shown the facility with which 
subjects make evaluations based on experimental behavior.
Kauffman (1971) has essentially replicated Alexander and Knight's 
procedures and findings in another counter-attitudinal study 
and Alexander and Weil (1969) have demonstrated the notion
that subjects act in line with the most favorable inferences 
in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game.
While these studies, particularly the Alexander and 
Knight study, provide evidence that Rosenberg's notions of 
evaluation apprehension do operate in these paradigms, more 
direct data come from Rosenberg himself (1969), however, in
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his programmatic approach to the study of the antecedents 
and effects of this motive. Representative of his studies 
was a person-perception task in which slides of faces were 
viewed by subjects who were asked to rate them according to 
how much they liked them and how successful they think the 
people owning the faces were. This task was given with a 
variety of instructions, among which was usually a "Back­
ground Information Sheet" which delivered various evaluation 
cues. One of these was a general cue, designed to heighten 
any evaluation apprehension that the subject may have had 
as he entered the experiment. Thus the subject was told in 
the past, performance in this task had been shown to corre­
late with personality, particularly with whether the rater 
was psychologically "mature" or "immature." In conditions 
designed to lower general evaluation apprehension, the sub­
ject was at this point informed that the purpose of the 
study was to merely construct normative data against which 
later comparisons would be made. Also given in the Back­
ground Information Sheet was information which provided 
directional evaluation cues, that is, cues which told the sub­
ject which behavior would elicit the most favorable evalua­
tion from the experimenter. Thus, the group given a direc­
tional cue was also told that the main burden of past research 
(with various invented journal articles cited) was to show 
that people who are more psychologically mature and healthy 
show a greater liking for strangers than do immature people.
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Another group was told the opposite, that mature people 
generally show a greater disliking.
The pictures are then rated on a 21-point like-dis- 
like scale, and the results showed that the picture ratings 
were reasonably consistently affected by the evaluation cues. 
It is also notable that subjects who scored high on the 
Marlowe-Crowne 5ocial Desirability Scale (Crowne &. Marlow, 
1960), a scale which measured need for social approval, were 
more influenced by evaluation cues than were those who scored 
lower.
Rosenberg has extended this research to other pro­
cedures, including a perceptual-motor task, and to the study 
of independent variables which interact with evaluation- 
apprehension cues, such as partial versus complete feedback, 
and whether or not the experimenter holds special prizes for 
the subject (Rosenberg, 1969). For the most part, the results 
of his research program were consistent in demonstrating that
1) such apprehension can be exacerbated by situational cues,
2) subjects bias their behavior in line with favorable evalu­
ations suggested by these cues, and 3) subjects high in need 
for social approval are affected more by these cues.
Other support for the notion that subjects try to 
get favorable evaluations from the experimenter come from a 
variety of sources. One particularly clever demonstration 
was by Gustafson and Orne (1965) where subjects were put in 
a lie-detector apparatus and told either that only psychopaths 
can successfully deceive in such a situation, or that mature
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and intelligent persons are able to deceive. Subjects were 
then told that they were successfully deceiving if they were 
in the psychopath condition, or unsuccessful at deceiving if 
they were in the intelligence condition. Skin resistance 
then increased as subjects learned about their failure to 
produce socially-desirable responses.
Other evidence from experimental manipulations appear 
in the verbal-conditioning paradigm where Page (1971) has 
demonstrated that the administration of a test, which is 
taken from the MMPI and includes general adjustment items 
and some items dealing with conformity behavior, signifi­
cantly reduced the amount of correct responses subjects gave. 
Apparently, according to Page, the personality test provided 
the kind of evaluation cues similar to Rosenberg's Background 
Information Sheet which suggested that the experimental task 
measured personality (the MMPI general items) and that con­
ditioning was a measure of conformity (suggested by the con­
formity items). Page interpreted this finding as demonstra­
ting that cooperation in such an experiment depends upon low 
levels of evaluation apprehension. This is a point about 
which more will be said later, but it should be noted that 
correlational evidence from Katkin, Risk, and Spielberger 
(1966) also supports the contention that subjects will not 
show conditioning if they think it demonstrates conformity.
In this study subjects who showed negative behavioral 
intentions but full awareness, often attributed conditioning 
to conformity and reported that they purposely tried not to
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conform. This occurred especially when the experimenter was 
seen as a high-status professor, rather than a low-status 
undergraduate.
Several studies in the attitude-change literature 
further elaborate the role of evaluation apprehension through 
direct manipulation. One of them is by Silverman (1968) who 
found that the greater attitude change found in the context 
of an experiment as opposed to a survey occurred principally 
in the condition in which subjects were requested to sign 
their names to their responses. Apparently, the name signing 
decreased anonymity, thereby increasing evaluation appre­
hension and hence, susceptibility to the demand characteris­
tics.
Another suggestive study was done by Silverman 
(Silverman, Schulman, &, Wiesenthal, 1 970) who varied the 
degree to which subjects were deceived in prior experiments 
and then gave them a series of standard psychological mea­
sures. The deceived subjects showed compliance with per­
ceived demand characteristics in some cases, such as in a 
persuasion test, but less compliance with demand characteris­
tics in a semantic-differential rating task. In another 
test, deceived subjects gave more favorable self-descriptions. 
These results were synthesized to suggest that the deception 
enhanced evaluation apprehension, leading to more careful 
self-presentation, less cooperation, but more persuasion, 
since the messages were abstracts of published articles 
written in a logical and factual style, and agreement with
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them would presumably show open-mindedness. Unfortunately, 
the study does not include any evidence that the subjects 
actually perceived the tasks as such, and so the results are 
only suggestive.
While these studies have been explicitly interpreted 
in terms of Rosenberg's formulations, it seems that a wide 
variety of other phenomena could also be explained with 
respect to evaluation apprehension. For instance, recent 
evidence shows that it seems to be at the heart of the social 
facilitation effect, whereby the presence of others enhances 
dominant responses while inhibiting subdominant ones (Zajonc, 
1965, 1966). The essential conditions for this effect have 
received much theoretical and empirical attention (i.e.,
Cohen &. Davis, 1 973; Cotrell, 1 968; Cox, 1 968 ; Hartens, 1 969; 
Matlin &. Zajonc, 1 968; Zajonc, 1 969), but an important aspect 
seems to be the evaluative nature of the situation (Cotrell,
1 968 ; Jones &. Gerard, 1 967). For example, Henchy and Glass 
(1968) have shown that the social facilitation effect depends 
upon an observer being perceived as an expert who makes care­
ful observations of the subjects' performance, even if not 
physically present. When the observer was perceived as a 
student just watching a psychology experiment, the facilita­
tion did not occur. Similar findings are reported by Cotrell, 
Wack, Sekerak and Rittle (1968) and Paul and Murdock (1971) 
whose subjects showed the facilitation effect with or without 
an audience only if they anticipated later evaluation.
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In an even broader vein, Weber and Cook (1972) have 
suggested that with few exceptions, most of the literature on 
subject roles can be interpreted in terms of the operation 
of evaluation apprehension. For example, while s.ub jects ' 
behavior in verbal-conditioning studies suggest the good- 
subject role, cooperation in this situation would also show 
the experimenter they had discerned the reinforcement con­
tingency, and solved the problem of what was making the 
experimenter say "good." This would demonstrate some degree 
of intelligence. Likewise, in studies of attitude change (as 
Silverman [l970] has noted) cooperation with demand charac­
teristics can be interpreted as demonstrating open-mindedness 
and flexibility. To the extent that subjects feel that 
compliance with expectations would reflect negatively upon 
them, they react negativistically, such as in the conformity 
studies of Horowitz and Rothchild (1970) and Adair (1972). 
These observations have led Weber and Cook to conclude that 
evidence for the good and negativistic roles are consistently 
confounded with evaluation apprehension, and that the most 
parsimonious formulation of subject motivation may be that 
evaluation apprehension is responsible for all subject-role 
behavior.
Evaluation Apprehension versus the Good Subject: 
Situational Cues 
At this point, it seems that much of the current 
literature on subject motivation is converging to support
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Weber and Cook's conclusion that the good subject may be a
special instance of the more general and pervasive evaluation
apprehension motive. This position contrasts sharply with
Orne's statement on the question:
Admittedly, subjects are concerned about their per­
formance in terms of reinforcing their self-image; none­
theless, they seem even more concerned with the utility 
of their performance [1969, p. 778].
The general term, demand characteristics, is open to 
considerable classification and specification, and it seems 
likely that the relative importance of cooperation versus 
apprehension might very well depend upon the different kinds 
of demand characteristics in any given experimental situation. 
For example, it seems plausible that the good subject is 
dependent upon the perception of hypothesis cues, those which 
would help him to discern what it is that the experimenter is 
expecting. These hypothesis cues include stimuli which Orne 
originally specified as demand characteristics in his pri­
mary emphasis on the good subject as the chief subject moti­
vation. From the review of the good subject literature, it 
seems that hypothesis cues operate in a wide variety of forms, 
from "panic buttons" to brand names of beer in taste-sensi- 
tivity experiments, to pre-tests in attitude-change studies. 
These hypothesis cues are relatively obvious in nature, but 
Rosenthal's research also suggests that they can be communi­
cated along very subtle lines from the experimenter, including 
the number of glances he gives while reading instructions, 
or the relative vocal emphasis he gives to certain words
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(Adair &. Epstein, 196B; Blake &. Heslin, 1971 ; Duncan &. 
Rosenthal, 19 68).^
The second major category of demand characteristics 
are then evaluation cues which serve to elicit or direct 
evaluation apprehension, by suggesting to the subject that 
his personality or intelligence is under scrutiny. In order 
for the subject to behave apprehensively, he has to perceive 
these cues, which can be further subdivided into general cues 
and directional cues. General cues elicit generalized evalu­
ation apprehension without the specific information of how to 
monitor one's performance to receive the best evaluation from 
the experimenter. They have been shown to be operative in 
such forms as a camera lens (Henchy & Glass, 1968) and the 
presence of an experimenter (Schulman, 1967) and would also 
seem to be communicated by an experiment title which empha­
sizes the study of personality (Page, 1973; Silverman, 1973) 
or by awesome machinery in the experimental laboratory 
(Franks &. Jenkins, 1 968 ).
2
Orne (1969) points out, however, that while experi­
menter bias effects can be included under the notion of 
demand characteristics in the sense that they are mediated to 
the subject by demands (Adair has also drawn this relation­
ship, 1973), in another sense they are quite different. The 
experimenter-bias effect is rooted in the motives of the 
experimenter, whereas demand characteristics are conceptual­
ized from the subject's point of view. Experimenter- 
expectancy effect can invade all science, as Rosenthal has 
demonstrated with "N Rays" (Rosenthal, 1966), but demand 
characteristics are only relevant to research with human sub­
jects, as light rays and other physical entities do not guess 
the hypothesis and perform accordingly. However, given the 
central issues of the present research, that of the human sub­
ject and his motives, it seems feasible for the present pur­
poses to include the experimenter-bias effects as a form of 




With this scheme in mind, it is possible to look at 
the relevant literature in terms of the interaction of 
hypothesis cues and either kinds of evaluation cues on behav­
ior.
For example, research dealing with the general cues 
has appeared within the domain of the experimenter-expectancy 
effect (hereafter EEE), following Rosenthal's (1966) sugges­
tion that some minimal amount of evaluation apprehension may 
be necessary for the EEE to operate at all. This notion has 
recently been supported empirically by Minor (1970), who 
introduced general evaluation cues by informing onegroup of 
subjects that the purpose of the person-perception task they 
were about to begin was to replicate the previous finding that 
those who are very inaccurate in their perceptions of people 
are maladjusted. This served as the High Evaluation Appre­
hension condition. The Low Evaluation Apprehension condition 
consisted of telling another group of subjects that the pur­
pose of the perception task was to gather baseline data 
against which the effects of fatigue and practice would be 
compared. Thus generalized evaluation apprehension was 
lowered by the information that personal characteristics were 
not relevant to the task. When experimenters led to expect 
different ratings then tested these subjects, it was found 
that the EEE was only operative in the general cue condition. 
Apparently, when evaluation apprehension was lowered, subjects 
either did not perceive the experimenter's cues., or did not
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bother to comply with them. This finding was also reported 
by Johnson (1973) who used a marble-dropping task and sug­
gested to some subjects that the rate of dropping was related 
to intelligence. The EEE was only found with these subjects, 
and only with experimenters who showed some concern about the 
outcome, suggesting that the EEE is not only mediated by 
evaluation apprehension on the part of the subject, but possi­
bly also by apprehension on the part of the experimenter as 
well.
To the extent that the psychological experiment is 
itself a general-evaluation cue, one would expect, with Rosen­
berg, that a certain amount would operate without any special 
manipulation of evaluation cues. That this certain amount 
is enough to mediate the EEE has been recently demonstrated 
by Duncan, Rosenberg, and Finkelstein (1969) who extended 
Minor's study to include a control group which was not told 
anything regarding the nature of the task. The results 
showed that subjects were influenced by the experimenter cues 
in both the High Evaluation condition as well as when no cue 
was given, but when it was suppressed in the Low Evaluation 
condition, the EEE again failed to be demonstrated.
What these studies suggest is that, unless evaluation 
apprehension is explicitly decreased, it will operate at a 
high-enough level to mediate subtle demand characteristics to 
produce the good subject. But because the operation of the 
experimenter cues depends upon the level of evaluation appre­
hension, it would appear that subjects are only ''good” if
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they believe they are to be evaluated. This position has 
recently been expressed with respect to less-subtle hypothe­
sis cues, such as in attitude-change studies (Silverman,
1 965, 1 970) and the effects of aggressive cues on aggressive 
behavior (Berkowitz, 1971). It seems that the current Zeit­
geist is viewing the apprehensive subject as much more com­
mon and basic than the good one.
The second line of evidence which has led to this 
position comes from those who have been engaged in directly 
testing the relative importance of the good versus the appre­
hensive roles by pitting directional evaluation cues against 
hypothesis cues. This was first done by 5igall, Aronson, and 
Van Hoose (1970) who attempted to present their subjects with 
a dilemma: they could either fulfill the experimenter's
expectations, err they could maximize looking good, but they 
could not do both. Since this study has been described as 
"crucial," (Rosnow, 1 970; Weber &. Cook, 1 972) in demonstrating 
the prepotency of evaluation apprehension over cooperation, a 
close look at it is important.
In their effort to pit the good and apprehensive 
motives against each other, these investigators gave subjects 
an assignment to copy telephone numbers for seven minutes, 
followed by further instructions regarding the task, and then 
a second trial on the task. In all conditions, the second 
trial was accompanied by a change in the lighting of the room, 
in that in all cases, illumination was cut in half. The 
experimenter mentioned to all subjects that he was investi-
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gating a hypothesis concerning the effect of illumination 
on work performance.
The information given between trials comprised the 
experimental treatment. In the "Increased-Output" condition, 
subjects were told by the experimenter that she expected an 
increase of twenty numbers for the next trial. Thus subjects 
were given the experimenter's hypothesis in explicit form, 
which was to increase. In the "Decreased-Output" condition, 
subjects were told that the experimenter expected a decrease 
of twenty numbers during the second trial. In both the 
"Increased Output" condition and the "Decreased Output" con­
dition, it was assumed by the experimenter that subjects 
would implicitly understand that copying more numbers was a 
better performance, and so any evaluation apprehension would 
lead to increased performance. Hence, in both conditions, 
there was an assumed directional evaluation cue to increase. 
This was not the case in their "Decreased-Output-Obsessive- 
Compulsive" condition in which subjects were told that 
"people who feel compelled to rush at a trivial, boring task 
like copying numbers tend to be obsessive compulsive [p.
274]." These Obsessive-Compulsive subjects were also informed 
of the hypothesis to decrease. (Unfortunately, there was no 
Obsessive-Compulsive group with a hypothesis cue to increase.)
The results of this study demonstrated that informa­
tion provided after the first trial systematically changed 
behavior on the second trial. Whereas there was no signifi­
cant change in performance for a control group which merely
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did two trials without any intervening information, the other 
groups did vary their performance according to the demand 
characteristics communicated. In both conditions where the 
evaluation cues and hypothesis cues were congruent, subjects 
changed their performance appropriately. That is, subjects 
in the Increased-Output condition increased, and those in 
the Decreased-Output-Obsessive-Compulsive condition lowered 
their performance. In the critical condition where the cues 
were conflicting, subjects increased their performance, even 
though the experimenter told them she expected a decrease. 
Because of the performance in this condition, the authors 
concluded that subjects, when faced with the dilemma of either 
confirming the hypothesis or presenting themselves favorably, 
will choose the latter. Therefore, the apprehensive role is 
more important than the good-subject role. Thus the results 
converge with those mentioned above regarding the EEE and 
suggest that subjects will only cooperate with the experi­
menter when it will enhance their self-presentation.
The conclusion seems plausible in terms of the data 
reported, and because it fits so well with these other lines 
of research, it was somewhat unexpected that a further elabo­
ration of this research paradigm suggested that the conclu­
sions may have been quite unwarranted. The essential weak­
ness of the study (which has been characteristic of most of 
the research reviewed above) was a failure to adequately per­
form manipulation checks to see if the cues in the situation 
really did lead the subject to perceive the experiment in the
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manner which the investigators assumed they would. Sigall 
et. al. did perform some very indirect attempts to check 
their manipulations, such as another control group which was 
used to verify the evaluation cue. This group was not given 
any hypothesis, but told only that the experimenter was 
interested in the effects of illumination on performance. On 
the second trial, this group increased its performance, sug­
gesting to the authors that the directional evaluation cue 
was operating because subjects were trying to impress the 
experimenter with better performance. However, this was 
still quite inferential, not being based on subject reports. 
They also used a post-experimental questionnaire to weed sub­
jects who might have been aware of the real hypothesis (i.e., 
the effects of cues) but in no case was there an attempt to 
validate the adequacy of the hypothesis cue in generating 
differential perceptions. Without knowing whether the cues 
were really creating differential awareness, there is little 
that can be said about the nature of subject motives to 
respond on the basis of them.
Fortunately, Adair and Schachter (1972) dealt with 
this problem by replicating and extending the Sigall et al. 
study. The primary rationale behind the Adair and Schachter 
experiment was their argument that even though the performance 
of Sigall et al.1s Decreased and Increased Output groups 
appeared the same (i.e., both groups increased their per­
formance), there is no evidence that the subjects behaved on 
the basis of the same perceptions, and thus the same evaluation
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motivation. Was performance in the critical Decreased Out­
put condition a result of the over-riding evaluation appre­
hension motive as Sigall et al. concluded, or could it have 
been due to a failure to communicate the hypothesis cues 
adequately? To test this question, Adair and Schachter 
varied the explicitness with which the hypothesis cue was 
communicated. In their Implicit condition, they used the 
exact procedure of Sigall et al. by informing subjects that 
the experimenter expected a decrease on the second trial. In 
the Explicit hypothesis conditions, this expectation was then 
elaborated by explaining the reasons for the hypothesis.
Thus each subject was told that "we have a theory that due to 
fatigue arising out of performing the practice trial, your 
output on this task would be expected to decrease [p. 78]."
The results of this explicit-implicit manipulation 
were striking. Whereas those subjects in the implicit con­
dition again increased their performance, those in the 
explicit condition decreased. The explanation for these 
results becomes clearer with the consideration of essential 
data from the post-experimental questionnaire. Here subjects 
were asked "How do you think you were supposed to perform on 
the second trial?" and they were given an opportunity to 
check one of the three responses: Increase (scored as 1),
Stay the Same (scored as 2), or Decrease (scored as 3). These 
scores, when subjected to an analysis of variance, indicated 
that there was a significant effect of the communication 
variable. Whereas subjects in the explicit condition had a
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mean score of 2.38, those in the Implicit (Sigall) condition 
had a mean score of 1.18. These means indicate that, 
although the subjects in the explicit condition were not 
impressively uniform in their perception of the hypothesis to 
decrease (uniform perception would have yielded a mean score 
of 3.00), they were at least more accurate than the subjects 
in the Implicit condition who showed a greater tendency to 
perceive a hypothesis to increase. Thus, it seems likely 
that the Sigall et al. subjects in the Decreased-Output con­
dition were not sacrificing the experimenter's expectations 
to create a good impression. It is passible that they were 
behaving in line with what they thought he was hypothesizing. 
Thus, we are left with no clear-cut support for the appre­
hensive role over the good-subject role.
Unfortunately, there still is not clear-cut support 
for the good-subject over the apprehensive one, either, for 
the Adair and 5chachter procedure had a serious problem which 
prevented the possibility of it being a reasonable test.
True, subjects in the explicit conditions decreased their per­
formance in line with experimental expectations. But by 
making the hypothesis explicit in the manner they did, it 
would seem likely that they destroyed any evaluation cues.
The casualness with which the evaluation cue was con­
sidered was started by Sigall et al. when they assumed that 
the more numbers copied, the more favorable the evaluation 
the subject would perceive he could win from the experimenter. 
What evidence there was for this conclusion was indirect and
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tentative; it was based primarily on a group which was not 
given a hypothesis cue, but when told that the experimenter 
was interested in the effects of illumination on performance, 
increased their performance. The Adair and Schachter study 
seemed to buy this assumption by leaving the evaluation cue 
as it was— basically more implicit than the original hypothe­
sis cue. However, in Adair and Schachter's explicit condi­
tion, they told subjects that performance was expected to 
decrease because of fatigue from the first trial. It is 
reasonable to assume that given this explanation in terms of 
fatigue, any possible perception of an evaluation cue would 
be seriously jeopardized. Under these conditions, any 
decrease in performance is expected because of situational 
determinants, i.e., a difficult task which makes all people 
in that condition tired. Either behavior is attributed to 
the situation, or it is attributed to personal qualities, a 
basic assumption underlying recent theoretical developments 
in the attribution processes (Heider, 1958; Kelly, 1967). 
Therefore, conforming to the experimenter's hypothesis would 
not have cost the subject anything in self-presentation 
because the experimenter had already given him a logical 
explanation for his behavior which did not reflect negatively 
upon him. In fact, this was precisely the information (i.e., 
"we are studying the effects of fatigue") which was used in 
previous studies to creat a Low Evaluation Apprehension Con­
dition (Duncan, Rosenthal, Finkelstein, 1969; Minor, 197U; 
Johnson, 1973). Unfortunately, Adair and Schachter provide
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us with no evidence that subjects perceived any evaluation 
cue, and so we are left with the very plausible interpreta­
tion that there may not have been any.
In order to adequately test this question, manipula­
tion checks are essential. What is needed is an experimental 
manipulation of cues which converge with awareness data to 
adequately determine the relative importance of these motives.
For this reason two recent attempts at separating 
these roles are also questionable. Rosnow, Goodstadt, 5uls, 
and Gitter (1973) assumed the communication of the experi­
menter's hypothesis in an impression-formation task and pitted 
it against information from a confederate who, in the middle 
of the experiment, suggested directional evaluation cues.
Even though the authors concluded that the importance of the 
evaluation apprehensive subject was demonstrated over the 
good-subject role, this is not clear because 1) no assessment 
of the perception of the cues was provided, and 2) their 
dependent variable data was not entirely consistent with 
their predictions.
In the second study, Geller and Endler (1972) based 
their independent variables on post-experimental data for 
hypothesis awareness and suspicion in a conformity task, and 
concluded that the apprehensive subject reigned over the good 
one because only those in a High Hypothesis Aware but Low 
Suspicion group conformed. However, their evidence is 
questionable on several counts. First, without any manipula­
tion of the situational cues, it is difficult to know just 
how subjects sorted themselves into the post-experimental
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awareness categories. Without experimental manipulation, a 
serious subject selection factor may operate which prohibits 
clear inferences regarding the causative role of subject 
motives. Secondly, the separation of the suspicion from 
hypothesis awareness in the conformity paradigm is unclear, 
since they would seem to be highly related. Indeed, the cell 
frequencies were grossly uneven. This situation violates 
the assumptions of the AIMDVA model, and throwing out two- 
thirds of the data in two different cells, as they did, 
resulted in a great loss of information. Third, as discussed 
previously, literature on the conformity paradigm is unclear 
regarding the perception that subjects have of the evaluation 
of conformity behavior. In some cases it appears that aware­
ness increases conformity, whereas others show the opposite 
or no effect. Without a direct measure of what conformity 
means to the subject, it is impossible to logically infer any­
thing about the effects of that evaluation of motivation. A 
better study would be within a paradigm in which the relation­
ship between the subject's awareness of the hypothesis and 
his cooperation was reliable.
Thus, the empirical support for the proposition that 
evaluation apprehension is more important and basic than the 
good-subject role is inadequate. Furthermore, it seems likely 
that for several other.; reasons, the apprehension role has 
been given an undue amount of importance in the analysis of 
subject motivations.
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First, as Weber and Cook (1972) point out, it is dif­
ficult to invalidate. The apprehensive role has very wide 
post-hoc explanatory latitude, as it can be evoked to explain 
a great deal of subject behavior in many different paradigms. 
However, it is not clear that in the many studies in which 
the good and apprehensive roles would lead to the same behav­
ior, such as those involving problem solving, ability tasks 
and attitude change, that it is a more important determinant 
than is the subject's desire to cooperate.
Secondly, the studies of the experimenter-expectancy 
effect which highlight the apprehensive role by suggesting 
that some minimal amounts of evaluation apprehension is neces­
sary for the effect to operate, represent a special situation 
in which it is likely that the importance of evaluation motives 
would be unduly inflated. This arises from the fact that in 
this paradigm, the hypothesis cues which the subject must 
follow if he is to demonstrate his good role are extremely 
subtle and difficult to recognize (indeed, experimenters are 
hardly able to). In this circumstance, it seems an unfair 
test of the good versus apprehensive roles because the subject 
must go beyond the obvious to discover the necessary hypothe­
sis cues. It is entirely possible that in these situations, 
only those who are motivated by some other concern, such as 
evaluation apprehension, might be willing or able to do this. 
The research doesn't tell us much about the wide range of 
experiments in which the hypothesis cues are more obvious to 
the subject. In these cases, it would seem reasonable that, 
while the presence of general evaluation cues might enhance 
compliance with hypothesis cues, subjects would also cooperate
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with them even when general evaluation apprehension was not 
purposely enhanced. If this were the case, the good-subject 
role would have status beyond a mere particular of the more 
general apprehensive role. What is needed is a paradigm 
where the hypothesis cues are obvious enough to be perceived 
without special cues for evaluation apprehension.
By selecting a paradigm in which the awareness of 
hypothesis cues is reliably correlated with cooperation with­
out special manipulations of evaluation cues, the effects of 
evaluation cues can be studied independently of hypothesis 
awareness. This would enable a factorial design in which 
hypothesis cues can be crossed with evaluation cues in an 
orthogonal manner appropriate for the analysis of variance 
model so that the nature of any interaction can be assessed.
The classical conditioning of attitude experiments, 
originally developed by Staats and Staats (1957) was chosen 
because it seemed to have characteristics suitable for exam­
ining cues which elicit cooperation and cues which elicit 
evaluation apprehension.
The Classical Conditioning of Attitudes Paradigm
In this task, subjects are brought into the labora­
tory in small groups (5 to 10) and told that the experiment 
deals with intermodality learning. They are instructed that 
nonsense syllables will be flashed up on the screen in front 
of them, and that as this is done, the experimenter will read
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words. Subjects are instructed to repeat the meaningful 
words as they are read. After this procedure, each subject 
is handed a rating booklet and asked to rate each nonsense 
syllable in the booklet according to how pleasant or .unpleas­
ant he feels it is (see Appendix D for the booklet). The 
rating scale is a 7-point semantic differential type dimension 
which runs from Pleasant to Unpleasant.
It has been demonstrated many times (Cohen, 1964;
Insko &. Oakes, 1 966; Hare, 1 964; Staats &. Staats, 1 957; Weber 
So Riddell, 1 973) that those nonsense syllables which are 
flashed while the experimenter reads positive words (such as 
sunshine, pleasant, rich, and healthy) are afterwards rated 
toward the pleasant end of the dimension, and those syllables 
which are paired with negative words (such as ugly, enemy, 
dirty, worry) receive more negative ratings. This was origi­
nally interpreted as demonstrating the classical conditioning 
of attitudes (Staats & Staats, 1957) because the nonsense 
syllables (C5) appeared to take on the meaning (CR) of the 
meaningful words (UC5) when they were paired together. In 
line with the classical-conditioning explanation, Staats and 
Staats argued for the elicited nature of this behavior, 
because they found the effect to hold up even when they 
discarded the data of the few subjects who, at the end of the 
experiment, were able to answer the question "What did you 
think the experiment was about?" with some indication of 
having understood the conditioning process. Thus, it appeared 
to the 5taats that the effects held with subjects who were
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completely unaware of being conditioned.
However, as one of the more consistent findings in 
the psychological literature, there has been the repeated 
demonstration that in this task, "conditioning" is highly 
correlated with post-experimental reports of awareness, if 
the subject is given a reasonable opportunity to report it 
(Cohen, 1 964; Hare, 1 964; Insko &. Oakes, 1 966; Page, 1 969; 
Weber &. Riddell, 1 973). This has been taken as evidence 
that the awareness of the contingencies (what nonsense sylla­
bles were paired with positive and negative words) and aware­
ness of the hypothesis (that consequently the experimenter 
expects one to rate the nonsense syllables accordingly) 
mediate behavior in this experiment, rather than the uncon­
scious mechanical effects of conditioning trials.
Although Staats has subsequently (1971) argued that 
the demonstration of this correlation doesn't rule out the 
conditioning interpretation, evidence suggesting the alterna­
tive demand awareness explanation is steadily growing. For 
example, Page has shown in a series of studies that the so- 
called conditioning effect is facilitated by subject's 
sophistication in psychology, and hampered by making the 
demands more difficult to discern by the addition of filler 
syllables (1969; 1970). Recently, he has also shown that 
subjects can easily produce the opposite response if requested 
(1973), further supporting the view that the responding in 
this situation is more likely a product of compliance with 
experimenter expectations than it is the elicited response of
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classical conditioning.
Unlike the number-copying task which was used by 
5igall, Aronson and Van Hoose for studying the effects of 
subject roles, the classical conditioning task has a rich 
history of controversy and empirical attention. It also has 
several other characteristics which make it particularly 
suitable for the purposes of the present study. First, 
unlike the Picture Rating task used to study the role of 
evaluation apprehension (Rosenberg, 1969) and its effects on 
mediating the good-subject role (Duncan, Rosenberg, &. Finkel- 
stein, 1969; Minor, 1970) the classical-conditioning task has, 
inherent in its procedures, hypothesis cues which are much more 
obvious. This is in part because it employs a kind of 
repeated measures design in which the subject sees positive, 
negative, and neutral words paired with different nonsense 
syllables, making it relatively easy for him to discern the 
pattern (about half of the subjectsdo, as shown by Page,
1969, and Weber and Riddell, 1973). Once the pattern is 
discerned (i.e., that YOF is always paired with positive 
words and WUH with negative) the hypothesis cue is almost 
always perceived. Thus, as Orne (1969) has suggested, studies 
in which the subject gets more than one level of the inde­
pendent variable are especially prone to the influence of 
demand characteristics because they facilitate the perception 
of what the experimenter expects on the basis of what changes 
in the experiment. This seems to be particularly the case in 
this paradigm.
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By enhancing the awareness of the contingency through 
instructing subjects of the relationship before the condi­
tioning trials, hypothesis awareness can be enhanced and the 
results on conditioning and reports of awareness assessed. 
Independent of this manipulation, evaluation cues can be 
introduced which would suggest a negative evaluation from the 
experimenter. The effects of these evaluation cues can be 
assessed in their interaction with hypothesis cues on the 
dependent variable, and on the measures of awareness. This 
then would give the necessary situation for the most valid 
study of subject roles to date— the independent manipulations 
of hypothesis and evaluation awareness in concert with their 
effects on subject awareness and cooperation.
Thus, the purpose of the present research was to ade­
quately examine the operation of the good and apprehensive 
roles by independent manipulation of hypothesis and evalua­
tions cues. The effect of these manipulations could then be 
discerned on the dependent variable, conditioning, which, 
when accompanied with awareness, would indicate cooperation. 
The independent manipulation of these two types of demand 
characteristics would also contribute important refinements 
to some of the very vague constructs suggested to account for 
subject behavior. For example, the term "demand characteris­
tics" can be further differentiated into two major types, 
hypothesis and evaluation cues. Also, the term "subject role" 
is one which has been used often (Adair, 1973; Weber & Cook, 
1972) without clear definition. In the context of the present
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research a "subject role" is operationalized as the effects 
of these types of cues on behavior. Thus, the good subject 
would receive support if the presence of hypothesis cues led 
to the increase in the hypothesized behavior. The appre­
hensive role would be empirically substantiated to the extent 
that evaluation cues enhanced the positively-valued behavior 
or, in this case, decreased the negatively-valued behavior.
It was predicted that the degree of subject coopera­
tion would depend upon the specific number and type of these 
cues present in a situation, and that the question of which 
role is more basic becomes less important than the knowledge 
of what cues in the experiment interact to elicit each role.
In order to provide further convergence for the 
central hypothesis, an individual-difference measure was 
chosen for study that should theoretically relate to the pro­
cess of perceiving and being affected by evaluation cues.
Since the Social Desirability (5D) scale of Crowne and Marlow 
(1964) was designed to measure need for social approval, and 
has been used in past studies of evaluation apprehension 
(Rosenberg, 1969) it was administered in order to test the 
prediction that subjects high in need for social approval 
would be more affected by the evaluation cues than subjects 
low in this need. Empirical support for this hypothesis 
would further validate the evaluation cues and provide a more
complete verification of the central hypothesis, through
«
anchoring the process to a set of responses not collected in 
the experimental situation.
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The Study of Post-Experimental Awareness
As suggested by the preceding discussion, subject 
reports of awareness are critical to the study of the effect 
of demand characteristics on behavior. Without the valida­
tion of such cues in the phenomenological perspective of the 
subject, it is inappropriate to draw conclusions about the 
effects of various cues on subject cooperation.
Subject awareness has also become a central issue in 
a continuing controversy within the conditioning literature, 
where a longstanding question concerns whether subjects must 
be aware in order to condition. This controversy represents 
a basic dissension between the behavioristic and cognitive 
approaches to the question of learning. The behaviorist has 
argued that such reports are another verbal response which 
is irrelevant to the conditioning phenomenon, while the cog­
nitive psychologist has viewed these as indicative of aware­
ness, which is the necessary mediating process between situa­
tional stimuli and resulting behavior.
While the legitimacy and importance of post-experi­
mental accounts of subject awareness is at the heart of this 
controversy, it has rarely been linked to the recent research 
concerning subject-role behavior. This is unfortunate, since 
a basic, but untested, assumption of the cognitive approach 
is that the subject is motivated to cooperate with the experi­
menter. In fact, the suggestion that awareness produces 
conditioning is based on the legitimacy of the good-subject 
role.
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Perhaps the most detailed and extended attention to 
this question has been within the verbal operant-conditioning 
paradigms of Greenspoon (1955) and Taffel (1955) in which a 
verbal response class is systematically reinforced by the 
experimenter with the words "good" or "hmmhmm." These 
studies concluded that the increase of emitted reinforced 
responses took place without the subject's being aware of 
the reinforcement contingency, since subjects who conditioned 
did not seem to be able to describe the correct contingency. 
Since then a great deal of controversy has resulted over the 
role of awareness in producing the conditioning effect.
Probably the most elaborate line of theorizing and 
methodological development within the cognitive approach has 
been by Dulaney (1962, 1968) whose work represents the extreme 
cognitive position. His Theory of Pro positional Control 
specifies that, in general, a person behaves as a function 
of his willfull compliance with rules which he deduces about 
his environment. Fishbein has extended the conceptualization 
to the study of attitudes, intentions, and behavior, and 
recently others have extended the model to voting behavior 
(Fishbein &. Coombs, 1971; Williams, Weber, Haaland, Mueller,
&. Craig, 1 973). Since its original conception was in terms 
of subject behavior in the verbal-conditioning laboratory, 
the present research is quite relevant in that it offers the 
possibility of extending Dulaney's theory to a closely- 
related kind of experimental situation, the classical con­
ditioning of meaning experiment. In the present study,
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empirical support of Dulaney's theoretical model would offer 
a further insight into the ways in which the manipulated cues 
affect responding, since validation of it would suggest that 
subjects respond to them in a very rational fashion.
According to the Theory of Propositional Control, 
what a subject does in an experiment is a function of his 
conscious cooperation with the propositions he has discerned 
about the situation. That is, his behavior depends upon his 
knowledge about the experiment (the rules) and his feelings 
about it (the ascriptors). A subject is only able to give 
the conditioned response if he knows the specific reinforce­
ment contingency, and this knowledge is critical, since the 
process begins here, and without contingency awareness, other 
aspects of awareness would not affect behavior. Once the 
subject becomes aware of the contingency rule, his subjective 
evaluation of the reinforcement becomes important in influ­
encing his understanding of the experimenter's behavioral 
hypothesis, for if the reinforcement is aversive, the subject 
is unlikely to infer that he is supposed to behave in order 
to maximize it. Thus the behavioral hypothesis is the next 
component of awareness which is produced by the multiplica­
tive relationship of the contingency rule and the subjective 
value of the reinforcement. If either of these is zero, the 
behavioral hypothesis will be zero. If either is negative, 
the subject will assume he is supposed to emit a response 
which is actually counter to the experimenter's expectations.
53
Once the behavioral hypothesis is established, the 
subject's motivation to comply with the experimenter becomes
important, since this must have a positive value in order for 
the subject to condition according to expectations. Thus 
behavioral hypothesis . and motivation-to-comply multiply to 
produce behavioral intention, which because of the volitional 
nature of such behavior, is the best predictor of performance 
on the dependent variable. Thus, the formal theoretical propo­
sition is indicated by the following model:
where the arrows read as "influences." Each of these components 
measured through a post-experimental questionnaire.
progresses from the subject's knowledge of the contingencies 
to his inference regarding the experimenter's hypothesis, to 
his behavioral intention, to the actual behavior. The first 
and second steps are influenced by the ascriptor values indi­
cating how much the subject desires the reinforcement and 
how much he wants to cooperate with the hypothesis. Thus the 
first requirement for learning is contingency awareness, which
X Subjective Value of Reinforcement




(unless the subjective value of the reinforcement is nega­
tive) produces a knowledge of the hypothesis. In the 
standard conditioning situation, contingency and hypothesis 
awareness are highly correlated. The effects of contingency 
awareness on conditioning are mediated through the production 
of the hypothesis, so that if hypothesis awareness is par- 
tialled out, the relationship between contingency awareness 
and conditioning falls to zero. Similarly, the effects of 
hypothesis awareness depend upon the production of a behav­
ioral intention, so that partialling out the behavioral 
intention leaves the relationship between the behavioral 
hypothesis and conditioning at zero. The dependent variable 
is most highly correlated with behavioral intention, next 
with behavioral hypothesis, next with contingency awareness.
This formulation is useful for approaching the study 
of awareness in the present experiment, since the assumptions 
are compatible with those of the present research: that in
order to cooperate with the demand characteristics of an 
experiment, two information requirements must be satisfied. 
The first is hypothesis awareness, or knowledge of what is 
expected, and the second is the absence of a reason for not 
cooperating. That is, without explicit reason, subjects will 
be good subjects and cooperate, but when given reasons not to 
cooperate (i.e., evaluation apprehension), they will resist 
behaving in line with hypothesis cues.
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Empirical Support for the Dulaney Model 
Previous research by Dulaney suggests that his 
model is very useful for describing behavior in several vari­
ations of the verbal operant conditioning experiment. For 
example, the components have been found to account for over 
90 percent of the variance in behavioral intention and con­
ditioning which both correlate highly with each other 
(Dulaney, 1962, 1968). Similarly, partialling out inter­
vening terms reduces the correlation of distal terms to zero. 
Thus, with behavioral intention out, the correlation between 
behavioral hypothesis and conditioning falls to zero. Like­
wise, correlating conditioning with each of the terms with­
out partialling produces an ordered model in that the best 
predictor of conditioning is behavioral intention, the next 
is behavioral hypothesis, and the weakest is contingency 
awareness. In a converging demonstration of the adequacy of 
the model, subjects with no contingency awareness are compared 
with fully-aware subjects and predictions are shown to hold 
only in the later case. When contingency awareness was 
absent, the relationship between the resulting behavior and 
each of the other temrs dropped to zero. All of these find­
ings have been replicated by others (Bottom, 1972; Doctor, 
1971; Uleman, 1971a, 1971b; Uleman &. Vandenbox, 1971 ) . Thus, 
there are converging lines of evidence based on many different 
analyses from several different laboratories which suggest 
that the effects of these components work in a systematic 
fashion such that subject motivation is dependent first upon
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hypothesis awareness, and then upon cooperation.
In the present experiment it is possible to adapt 
the Dulaney formulation through some translations and modi­
fications. Contingency awareness (CA) is analagous and can 
be measured by asking subjects which nonsense syllables were 
paired with pleasant and unpleasant words (i.e., Insko &. Oakes, 
1966; Page, 1969). The behavioral hypothesis in Dulaney's 
paradigm is essentially the same as Page's demand awareness 
(DA) or hypothesis awareness (HA) which is measured by asking 
subjects how they think the experimenter expected them to rate 
various key syllables. The measure of motivation to comply 
(MC) is identical (i.e., "How much did you want to behave 
according to the way the experimenter expected you to").
Since past research has revealed some problems with this 
component (Dulaney, personal communication, 1973; Bottom,
1972; Uleman, 1972, b) an item from Page's (1969) post- 
experimental questionnaire could also be used as perhaps a 
more successful operationalization.
5ome of the terms do not translate so readily, how­
ever,, Behavioral intention produces the most serious problem, 
since it becomes meaningless in the present case where the 
dependent variable involves a single response rather than a 
pattern of responses over time, as in the verbal operant para­
digm. Asking a subject how he intended to rate a nonsense 
syllable is likely to be translated by the subject as "How 
did you rate the syllable" since it is difficult to recognize 
any possible discrepancy between the intention to perform
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this specific response and the actual performance of it. Sub­
jective value of the reinforcement is also a less meaningful 
term in the classical conditioning experiment, since the 
evaluative dimensions of the words used as UCSs are much 
more variable than the single reinforcement given in the ver­
bal operant paradigm.
In spite of the loss of these components in the model, 
the basic rationale is still testable. Conditioning should 
be a multiplicate function of HA and MC. And CA and evalua­
tion awareness (EA), which are types of awareness that are 
being manipulated in this study, should affect conditioning 
through their operation on HA and MC respectively. Thus, a 
theoretical network appropriate for the present study would 
seem to be
CA
HA X MC >DV
?
EA
where the arrows represent oneway causal paths. This model 
is then testable through the following predictions:
1) DV should be more highly correlated with HA x MC than with 
EA or CA
2) Partialling HA x MC reduces the relationship of DV to EA 
and CA to zero.
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Support for these predictions would suggest that sub­
jects select their responses in a highly cognitive, conscious 
manner consistent with the formulation of propositional con­
trol. Failure to support these predictions would suggest a 
view of subject performance more in keeping with the sug­
gestions of Orne and Rosenberg that subjects have little con­
scious control over these behaviors.
According to Orne, the subject may not employ a con­
scious motivation to comply even though he systematically 
does cooperate, and so one would not expect the MC term to 
have much predictive value on the dependent variable, nor to 
aid in prediction when it is multiplied by hypothesis aware­
ness. To the extent that it could be shown that the MC mea­
sure was valid, and yet did not correlate with DV, with or 
without being multiplied by HA, Orne's position would receive 
empirical support.
Rosenberg would take a similar stand with regard to 
the measurement of EA, since he has previously suggested that 
subjectsdo not recognize the extent to which they are respond­
ing according to evaluative concerns, and so would not be 
expected to insightfully report them. Thus, to the extent 
that it could be shown that the EA measure was valid, and yet 
did not correlate with DV, or did not contribute to DV through 
the MC term, Rosenberg's position would be supported.
59
Overview of the Research Objectives
As this chapter indicates, there are several issues 
addressed by the research, and it should be noted that the 
study was designed to investigate subject behavior at several 
levels of observation.
The first and most important question regards the 
effects of situational manipulations of types of demand 
characteristics on subject behavior. By independently vary­
ing hypothesis and evaluation cues, incidence of cooperation 
and resistence could be observed. By choosing the classical 
conditioning of attitudes paradigm, these manipulattons could 
be made orthogonal. 5ince previous pilot research indicated 
that credibility problems arose from informing subjects of 
the experimental hypothesis directly, hypothesis awareness 
was manipulated by enhancing contingency awareness. Thus 
contingency information served as the first variable, which 
was crossed with evaluation cues in the form of the presence 
or absence of a conformity test and the presence or absence 
of an accomplice who suggested that the experiment was about 
conformity. This allowed for the operational specification 
of the good and apprehensive roles, which were linked directly 
with experimental procedures.
In addition to the situational manipulations, a per­
sonality variable provided further validation of the major 
predictions by representing a chronic manipulation (McGuire,
1 968) of the same construct being tapped by the acute manipu­
lation of evaluation cues, i.e., the probability of evaluation
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apprehensiveness. Thus the SD scale of Crowne and Marlow 
was dichotomized as an additional independent variable, and 
predictions regarding its interaction with the cues were 
tested.
The need for valid manipulation checks of the situa­
tional manipulations gave rise to an additional set of research 
objectives: to trace the effects of these cues on post-
experimental awareness. By performing convergent and dis­
criminate validation checks, the validity of the cues could 
be assessed in the most thorough manner to date. Thus, the 
effects of contingency information on contingency and hypothe­
sis awareness could be assessed, and the effects of evalua­
tion cues on evaluation awareness could be assessed to pro­
vide evidence of convergent validity. The effects of con­
tingency information on evaluation awareness and the effects 
of the evaluation cues on contingency and hypothesis aware­
ness could be assessed to provide evidence of discriminant 
validity. Thus, in combination with the cue manipulations, 
these measures provided an opportunity for a conceptualiza­
tion and operationalization of the cooperative and appre­
hensive roles which is perhaps the clearest in the murky his­
tory of these concepts.
Finally, the need to gather awareness data allowed 
the opportunity to investigate a secondary question regarding 
the degree to which such awareness reports affect behavior 
according to the model of propositional control. To the 
degree that predictions dervied from the Dulaney model held,
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the effects of demand characteristics could be further speci­
fied as being the result of a very conscious decision-making 
process.
Thus, the major questions which were asked involved
1) the effects of hypothesis and evaluation cues, as well as 
the subjects need for social approval, on behavior, 2) the 
relationships of such manipulations to subject reports of 
awareness, and 3) the relationship between various components 
of awareness and their relationship to overt behavior. In 
this fashion, there was a triangulation of observations which 
is diagrammed in Figure 1.
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The experimental design employed three situational 
manipulations and one individual difference factor to pro­
duce a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2  factorial design. The four factors were 
contingency information (hypothesis cue), test and accomplice 
(evaluation cues), and high or low social desirability. 
Operationalization of each of these independent variables is 
described below.
Factor 1: Contingency Information (Cl)
Since previous pilot research indicated that subjects
become very suspicious of explicit information about the
experimenter's hypothesis, hypothesis awareness was manipu­
lated through the delivery of contingency information. Sub­
jects in the Information (I) conditions were given explicit 
information regarding which syllables would be paired with 
positive and negative words, while subjects in the IMo-Informa- 
tion (NI) conditions were not given such information. The 
exact wording and procedures of this manipulation,as well as
those for the next two factors, are described in the procedure
section which follows.
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Factor 2: Test (T)
The second factor served as one of the evaluation 
cue factors, in which a personality test obviously dealing 
with conformity either was or was not administered to sub­
jects at the beginning of the experimental session.
Factor 3: Accomplice (A)
The third factor and second evaluation cue factor was 
adapted from Rosnow, Goodstadt, Suls and Gitter (1973) and 
consisted of an accomplice who either did or did not ask a 
question in the middle of the experiment about the purpose 
of the study, suggesting that it dealt with conformity.
Factor 4: Social Desirability
The fourth factor consisted of two levels of scores 
on the Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (SD) which was 
administered some time before the experimental sessions were 
run. Scores on this scale were split at the median, creating 
the dichotomized variable.
Subjects
Subjects were University of New Hampshire Introductory 
Psychology students who were required to participate in a 
number of psychology experiments as part of their laboratory 
experience. They were recruited from two large lecture sec­
tions because of the necessity of having them take the Social 
Desirability scale before the experiment was run.
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Procedure
Collection of Individual Difference Measure
Approximately four weeks before the experiment was 
run, subjects were given the Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability 
Scale which is presented in Appendix B. This measure was 
collected while the subjects were in class, by their instruc­
tors, who explained that it was part of a class demonstration 
planned for a later date. The experimenter was not present. 
Responses were made on IBM scanning sheets and machine scored.
Experimental Procedure
Subjects signed up to participate in experimental 
sessions depending upon their score on the 5D measure. Each 
name listed on class rosters was assigned a letter depending 
upon whether the individual scored above or below the median.
A third letter was given to persons who did not take the mea­
sure. Subjects then signed up for experimental sessions 
within the appropriate letter slot so that each session had 
approximately the same number of high scorers, low scorers, 
and no scorers. Subjects were not aware cf the relationship 
between their letter designation and their scores on the 5D 
scale. Experimental sessions lasted for approximately one 
hour, and were conducted within a two and one-half week 
period, in similar numbers of morning, afternoon, and evening 
sessions. Experimental conditions were varied randomly, 
according to a blind procedure described below.
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After subjects were checked in, they were led to a 
group testing room in which 16 chairs faced a screen, and a 
projector and tape recorder were located in the back where 
the experimenter could operate them. Subjects were given 
notebooks and pencils, were told that the experiment con­
sisted of several parts, each of which had tape-recorded 
instructions. The rest of the experimental instructions 
were then delivered by tape.
Several versions of the same master tape were recorded 
so that instructional manipulations could be varied while the 
rest of the information and its delivery remained constant.
Standard Staats and 5taats Procedure
The experimental procedure which served as a core and 
to which the various cue manipulations were added was followed 
for subjects in all conditions. This occurred in the follow­
ing manner:
1. The tape recorder was turned on and subjects 
heard the General Instructions (see Appendix A) which were 
fashioned after 5taats and Staats (1957), describing the 
study as one of intermodality learning, and requesting that 
subjects pay attention to the nonsense syllables to be flashed 
on the screen in front of them, and at the same time to repat 
the word on the tape recorder in a loud, clear voice, together 
as a group. After the tape asked for any questions, and the 
experimenter walked to the front of the room to check if there 
were any, the lights were turned off, and the tape recorder 
and slide projecter turned on simultaneously, so that after
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each word was read from the tape, the experimenter advanced 
the projector to the next slide. In this way, all subjects 
heard the same auditory stimuli in conjunction with the non­
sense syllables. The only qualification of this involves 
the control procedure in which the key syllables were switched 
every other session, so that half of the time YOF was paired 
with positive words and WUH with negative, while the other 
half of the time YOF was paired with negative and WUH with 
positive. This insured that any pre-experimental attitudes 
about the syllables (particularly to WUH, which is very simi­
lar to the university's initials UIMH) could not confound the 
dependent variable.
2. After all the syllables had been shown, the lights 
were turned on again and the Dependent Variable Rating Scale 
(see Appendix C) was passed out to each subject. The tape 
then delivered the Dependent Variable Instructions (see 
Appendix A). This information instructed subjects to mark 
each syllable in the booklet according to how pleasant or 
unpleasant they felt it was, and also the check whether the 
syllable was presented on the screen or not. The booklet 
contained 16 syllables, 5 of which had actually been pre­
sented. At the completion of these instructions, the tape 
asked for any questions which the subject might have and the 
experimenter walked to the front of the room to see if there 
were any.
3. After all subjects finished the rating scale, the 
scales were collected, and the post-experimental questionnaire
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(see Appendix E) was passed out, and instructions for it pre­
sented on the tape (see Appendix A). These instructions 
emphasized that the questionnaire was the most important part 
of the study and that if there were any problems in filling 
it out, subjects were urged to ask the experimenter.
4. After all subjects finished the post-experimental 
questionnaire, the questionnaires were collected and the 
experimenter urged the participants not to speak of the experi­
ment with their friends. Subjects were then dismissed. 
Debriefing was conducted several weeks later in the intro­
ductory classes, and the major analysis of the independent 
variables was reported. In line with the department's policy 
concerning the use of introductory students as subjects, each 
subject wrote a debriefing resume which 1is ted the major area 
of research, major question being asked, independent and 
dependent variables, results, implications, and subjective 
evaluation. These reports were read by the experimenter and 
credit was given to the subject for participating if the 
majority of the information was correct (criteria focused 
on the correct specification of the independent and dependent 
variables).
Manipulations of Basic Procedure
Subjects in the No Information-No Test-No Accomplice 
condition experienced the procedures described above. The 
other conditions were created by the addition of various cues 
to this basic procedure in the following manner:
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Contingency Information. During the General Instruc­
tions described in step 1, a sentence was dubbed into the tape 
which described the contingencies (see Appendix A for exact 
placement). This sentence indicated that during the pairing 
of the syllables and words, "it will become obvious that two 
of the syllables are special. They are special because one 
of them, YOF will always be paired with words of positive or 
pleasant meaning, and WUH will always be paired with words 
of neutral meaning." (In line with the control for pre- 
experimental attitudes regarding the syllables, this sentence 
was changed half of the time by dubbing YOF for WUH, and vice 
versa, so that the contingencies were switched while the rest 
of the sentence remained constant.) 5ubjects in the No Infor­
mation conditions did not hear this spliced-in sentence.
Test. The Test manipulation was made at the beginning 
of the experiment, just after subjects were told that the 
experimental instructions would be delivered by tape and before 
step 1 of the standard procedure described above. In this 
Test condition (T) a personality test was passed out to each 
subject, and the first instructions heard on the tape described
instructions for completing it (see Appendix A). The items
on the test were statements which dealt with the conformity
process (see Appendix D) such as "I have had some people tell
me that I am too gullible," "I think its important not to 
'rock the boat,1" and "I think cooperation is more important 
than individualism." These items were written by the author 
in an attempt to make the issue of conformity a salient one
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and suggest that the test was measuring a person's tendency 
to conform. Many of the items were fashioned after the MMPI 
scale, which was the source of a similar manipulation by Page 
(1 971 ) .
After subjects completed the scale, they were asked 
to put their names and introductory class section numbers on 
it, in an attempt to enhance evaluation apprehension.
Accomplice. In the Accomplice conditions, an accom­
plice of the experimenter asked a question directly after the 
instructions for the dependent variable described in step 2 
of the standard procedures, and before subjects began rating 
the syllables. The confederate was present at every session, 
and according to a schedule to which the experimenter was 
blind, either raised his hand to ask or did not raise his 
hand to ask the following question:
A friend of mine was in this experiment last week. Isn't 
this the experiment which is really a test of conformity, 
rather than intermodality learning? Aren't you really 
deceiving us, and actually showing that those who rate 
the nonsense syllables according to the way they were 
paired are really conforming or gullible?"
The experimenter's reaction to this was an extended stare (5
to 10 seconds) with the comment, "I'll answer that question
when the experiment is over, if you don't mind."
Scoring Procedures
There were seven variables to be scored, and they are
described in the following order: 1) Individual Difference
Measure, 2) Dependent Variable, and 3) Mediators and Manipula­
tion Checks.
71
Individual Difference Measure. The scoring of the 
Social Desirability 5cale, 33 items in length, followed the 
procedures set forth by Crowne and Marlow (1964). Direction 
of wording was counterbalanced in the measure itself. The 
scores on the SD scale could range between □ and 33, with a 
high score indicating high social desirability. The actual 
distribution observed is presented in Figure 2, where it can 
be seen that the range varied from 1 to 29 with a standard 
deviation of 5.321. The median was 14.50, and so subjects 
who scored 14 and below were assigned to the Low SD condition, 
while subjects who scored 15 and above were assigned to the 
High SD condition.
Dependent Variable (DV). The dependent variable, 
that of amount of conditioning, was scored in the manner of 
previous studies (Page, 1969; Weber &. Riddell, 1973). Spe­
cifically, numerical values of 1 to 7 were assigned to 
responses on the pleasant-unpleasant dimension. The score on 
the positively-paired syllable was then subtracted from the 
score on the negatively-paired syllable yielding a measure 
of conditioning which ranged between 6 (indicating full con­
ditioning) to -6 (indicating conditioning in the opposite 
direction), with zero indicating no conditioning effect at 
all.
Since the contingencies of the key syllables were 
switched every other session, this scoring procedure insured 
that any pre-experimental attitudes toward the specific 
syllables could not confound the results.
MEAN t 14 .403 SD = 5. 321 N = 412 RANGE = 1-29
SCORE Z SCO. TR-SCO. FREQ. PCT. ONE * = 1
1 -2.52 248 2 0 j * *
2 -2.33 266 2 1 j * *
3 -2.14 285 3 2 j * * *
4 -1 .96 304 5 3 j * * * * *
5 -1 .77 323 7 5 I * * * * * * *
6 -1 .58 342 11 7 j ***********
SD 7 -1 .39 360 6 9 I * * * * * *
91 9 8 -1 .20 379 1 5 1 2 j ***************c. I c.
9 -1 .02 398 20 1 7 j ********************
10 -0.83 417 23 23 I ***********************
11 -0.64 436 33 31 I *********************************
12 -0.45 454 34 39 j **********************************
13 -0.26 473 22 44 I * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
14 -0.08 492 29 51 I *****************************
1 5 0.11 511 29 59 j  *****************************
1 6 0.30 530 37 67 I * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
17 0.49 548 24 73 j ************************
1 8 0.68 567 19 78 j *******************
19 0.86 586 1 5 82 j ***************
20 1 .05 605 1 7 86 I * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
h SD 21 1 .24 623 1 5 89 I ***************
200 22 1 .43 642 1 6 93
j ****************
23 1 .62 661 9 95 I * * * * * * * * *
24 1 .80 680 7 97 ' I * * * * * * *
25 1 .99 699 2 98 I * *
26 2.18 717 4 99 I * * * *
27 2.37 736 4 99 j  ****
28 2.56 755 1 99 I*
29 2.74 774 1 99 I*
2. Distribution of SD scores with median split indicated. -j
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Mediators and Manipulation Checks. 1) Contingency 
Awareness (CA). Contingency awareness was measured by items 
6 and 7 on the post-experimental questionnaire (see Appendix 
E), designed after Page (1969). However, this measure was 
scored on a continuum rather than on a dichotomy so that the 
maximum amount of information could be used in the analysis 
of awareness. The item asked the subject which syllable was 
paired with positive and negative words. The correct answer 
to these questions, two CVC nonsense syllables, involved six 
letters, three for each question, and one point was given for 
each correct letter identified. Thus, the CA measure ranged 
between zero and 6, with 6 indicating full awarness, and zero 
indicating no awareness. In the few cases (5/385) in which 
subjects indicated the positively paired CVC in response to 
the question regarding the negatively-paired syllable (and 
vice versa), a score of -6 was assigned, indicating awareness 
of the opposite contingency.
2) Hypothesis Awareness (HA). Hypothesis awareness 
was measured by items 8 and 9 on the post-experimental ques­
tionnaire (see Appendix E). Each dimension was scaled from 
1 to 7, and similar to the manner in which the DV was scored, 
the score on the positively-paired syllable was subtracted 
from the score on the negatively-paired syllable, yielding a 
measure of HA which ranged between 6 (indicating full aware­
ness) to zero (indicating no awareness) to -6 (indicating 
awareness of the opposite expectation).
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3) Evaluation Awareness (EA). Three items were used 
to measure evaluation awareness. The first was item 10 which 
was fashioned after Dulaney's method of measuring awareness 
in a multiple-choice format. Subjects who checked alternative 
A were assigned a score of 1, B a score of 2 , C a score of 3,
D a score of 4, E a score of 5, and F a score of 6.
The second measure of EA consisted of items 11 and 12, 
which were short-answer essays asking the subject "If a per­
son rated the nonsense syllables (or in 12, did not rate the 
nonsense syllables) according to the pleasant or unpleasant 
words they were paired with, what would this indicate about 
his personality or intelligence?
Answers to this item required more elaborate scoring 
procedures. If a subject indicated a strong statement of 
some negative quality in 11 and some positive quality in 12, 
(such as "He's gullible" and "He's got a mind of hiw own") 
then he was assigned a score of -2. A milder statement, indi­
cating less certainty (i.e., "I'm not surebut . . .") received
a score of -1. Similarly, if the subject indicated a strong 
statement of some positive quality in 11 and some negative 
quality in 12 (such as "He's intelligent" versus "He didn't 
pay attention") a score of +2 was assigned. A milder, less 
certain statement in the same direction was given a -1. A 
zero was assigned if answers to both items were both positive 
or both negative (thereby cancelling each other) or if the 




Since this item entailed a subjective judgment, a 
reliability assessment was performed by having another 
judge, blind to the evaluation cue conditions and the purpose 
of the experiment, rate the answers according to the above 
system. Since the interjudge reliability correlation was 
quite high (.9357), the first judge's ratings were used as 
the score.
The third measure of evaluation awareness involved 
answers to item 13, which asked the subject to rate a person 
who would condition on a series of dimensions. The gullible 
versus not gullible dimension and the individualistic versus 
conforming dimension were used, and responses on these scales 
were scored from 1 to 7.
4) Motivation to Comply (MC). Two items were used 
to measure motivation to comply. The first, item 14 was 
taken directly from the Dulaney paradigm (Dulaney, 1968; 
personal communication, 1973) and simply asked the subject 
"During the experiment, did you want to rate the syllables 
the way you thought the experimenter expected you to?"
Answers to this were scored along a 1-to-7 continuum. The 
second item (15) was fashioned after Page (1971) which served 
as an elaboration of the first item, involving the subject's 
desire to help the hypothesis along. This was also scored 
along a 1-to-7 continuum. Both items were scored in a nega­
tive direction with 1 indicating much desire to comply, and 7 
indicating no desire, or desire to the opposite. These items 
yielded measures of MC which were sublabeled MC^ (item 14, for 




Type I: Manipulation Checks
Convergent Validity Checks.
1. Contingency Information Factor (C.I.)
a. A significant effect of C.I. was predicted 
such that more Contingency Awareness as mea­
sured by items 6 and 7 would occur at I than
at NI. This was tested by a single factor 
analysis of variance.
b. A significant effect of C.I. was predicted 
such that more Hypothesis Awareness, as mea­
sured by items 0 and 9 would occur at I than
at NI. This was tested by a single factor
analysis of variance.
2. Evaluation Cue Factors. This was tested by a
single factor analysis of variance. It was pre­
dicted that more evaluation awareness would be 
measured by items 10, 11, 12, and 13 when more 
cues were present than when less cues were present. 
Since previous pilot work with the dependent 
variable suggested stronger effects for the 
accomplice than for the test manipulation, a 
pattern of means was predicted such than an inter­
action between the two factors would be yielded 





1. Contingency Information Factor. It was predicted 
that there would be no significant effect of Cl 
on various measures of EA (items 10, 11 and 12,
13), as tested by a single factor analysis of 
variance.
2. Evaluation Cue Factors.
a. It was predicted that there would be no sig­
nificant effect of the evaluation cues on CA.
b. It was predicted that there would be no sig­
nificant effect of the evaluation cues on HA, 
as tested by a single factor analysis of 
variance.
Type II: The Effects of Manipulations
on Conditioning
A four-factor interaction between the two evaluation 
cues, contingency information, and social desirability was 
predicted which is represented in Figure 3. The nature of 
this interaction may be briefly described as follows: that
the relative effects of the evaluation cues in decreasing con­











































Fig. 3. Predicted interaction of independent variables 
on conditioning based on pilot work.
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need for approval such that the evaluation cues would be 
more powerful when contingency information was present and 
among High SD subjects, than that which would be predicted 
on the basis of the Cl and SD factors alone.
With regard to specific factors, the interaction can 
be specified as it relates to the following hypotheses, listed 
in order of importance:
H1. Subjects will cooperate unless there are clear evalu­
ative reasons for not cooperating, indicating evidence of 
both the good and apprehensive roles.
Thus, it was predicted that the significant simple 
effects of contingency information in increasing conditioning 
would be most numerous when no evaluation cues were present, 
least numerous when both evaluation cues were present, and 
of intermediate number when only one evaluation cue was present.
Since this relationship was expected to be stronger 
for High SD than for Low SD subjects, any non-significant 
differences in the one or both cue conditions were expected 
to occur among Low SD subjects, and any significant differences 
in the no-cue condition were expected to occur among High SD 
subjects.
H2. The effectiveness of the evaluation cues in decreasing 
conditioning depends upon the effective communication of 
hypothesis cues.
Thus, it was predicted that the significant simple 
effects of evaluation cues in decreasing conditioning would
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be more numerous at I conditions than at NI conditions.
Since this relationship was expected to be stronger 
for the High SD than the Low SD subjects, any non-significant 
differences in the I conditions were expected to occur among 
Low SD subjects (and/or when the other evaluation cue was 
absent) and any significant differences which occurred in the 
NI conditions were expected to occur among High 5D subjects 
(and/or when the other evaluation cue was present).
H3. Subjects' needs for social approval interacts with hypoth­
esis and evaluation cues such that the SD factor is more 
effective when many cues are present.
Thus it was predicted that there would be the greatest 
number of simple effects of 5D as the number of cues increased, 
and that these effects would occur such that,relative to Low 
SD subjects, High 5D subjects would condition more when no 
evaluation cues were present, especially when contingency 
information was given,but condition less when evaluation cues 
were present, especially when contingency information was 
given.
Since previous pilot work suggested an.interaction 
among the evaluation cues, it was further predicted that the 
effectiveness of the test would be dependent upon the presence 
of the accomplice, but that effectiveness of the accomplice 
would not depend upon the presence of the test.
This prediction rests on the assumption that the 
accomplice produces more evaluation awareness than does the
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test, which could be checked in the current study with the 
various measures of evaluation awareness. Should the measures 
of evaluation awareness suggest they are additive, this pre­
diction would be refined accordingly.
Type III: The Study of Awareness
H4. The effects of evaluation awareness depends upon the 
prior presence of hypothesis awareness. This hypothesis is 
tested by the following predictions:
1. When HA = 1 or 2, correlation between EA and DV = □.
2. When HA = 6 or 7, correlation between EA and DV is posi­
tive and significant.
3. When EA = 0, correlation between HA and DV is still positive 
and significant.
H5. The effects of awareness operate according to the Dulaney 
theory of propositional control. The model to be tested within 
the current paradigm was
CA
if
HA X MC — + DV
t
EA
where the arrows represent one-way causal paths. The multi­
plicative relationship between HA and MC indicates that, when 
either term is zero, the resulting conditioning is also zero.
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The following predictions test this model:
H5a. A "ladder" of correlations should appear between the 





H5b. The partialling of intervening terms should reduce the 
correlation between the adjacent terms to zero. Thus, the 
correlation between CA and DV with HA x MC partialled = □, 
the correlation between EA and DV with HA x MC partialled = □.
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III. RESULT5
Results are reported within three major sections: 
manipulation checks (Part I); the effects of manipulations 
on behavior (Part II) and correlational data from the post- 
experimental questionnaire relating behavior to awareness 
(Part III). Refinements of some predictions in Part II are 
based on findings in Part I.
A total of 385 subjects participated in the experi­
mental session, but only 322 of these had previously taken 
the 5D measure. Since care was taken to insure that subjects 
filling out the 5D scale did not associate that exercise with 
the experiment, the possibility that the 63 subjects who did 
not fill out the scale being different from the 322 who did 
seemed minimal, and the total available data were used in 
each analysis. Therefore, the total N for the analyses reported 
in Part I and Part III was 385, whereas in Part II, in which 
SD was a factor, it was 322.
Part I: Manipulation Checks
The convergent validity data present a reasonably 
clear pattern which suggests that each of the independent 
situational manipulations were successful in producing the 
desired effects on subject awareness. Most measures of dis­
criminant validity show that these manipulations were not 




Contingency Information Factor. The delivery of 
contingency information produced the predicted effects on 
both contingency and hypothesis awareness. Subjects in the 
I condition had a mean CA score of 5.51, while those in the 
NI condition had a mean of 3.88. This difference was signifi­
cant beyond the .001 level (_F = 55.68, djf 1/380).
The effects of the information were similar on the 
measure of hypothesis awareness. Those in the I condition 
had a mean HA of 5.41, while those in the NI condition had a 
mean of 3.67. This difference as also significant beyond 
the .001 level (F = 49.11, df 1/383).
Evaluation Cues. There were four measures of evalua­
tion awareness used to assess the validity of the evaluation 
cue factors.
The first item was 10, fashioned after Dulaney's 
measure of awareness in multiple-choice format. The means 
on this item are presented in Table 1, along with the 2 x 2  
AN0VA which indicated that the Test factor was significant 
(.EL *05), while the Accomplice factor was not. Contrary to 
predictions, there was no significant interaction between the 
two factors.
The second item was the essay items (11 and 12). The 
means obtained for this are shown in Table 2, along with the 
corresponding analysis of variance. As can be seen, evaluation




EFFECT OF EVALUATION CUES ON DULANEY-TYPE MULTIPLE 




No Accom 3.21 3.01
5ource SS DF MS F P <
Test B.077 1 8.077 4.599 .05
Accom .474 1 .474
T X A .775 1 .775
Error 66B.9 381 1.756
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T A B L E  2
EFFECT OF EVALUATION CUES ON ESSAY 




No Accom -.1 75 .474
Source SS DF MS F P <
Test 43.675 1 43.675 19.089 .01
Accom 8.61 0 1 8.61 0 3.763 .05
T X A .063 1 .063
Error 869.721 380 2.288
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cues produced significant effects, the Test factor reaching 
significance at the .01 level, the Accomplice reaching it at 
the .05. Again, the interaction between the two factors was 
not significant.
The two additional measures of evaluation awareness 
asked subjects to attribute degrees of gullibility and con­
formity to a subject who conditioned. The means obtained 
from these items are presented in Tables 3 and 4, where it 
can be seen that the Test factor was significantly related 
to attribute, conformity (£<.05) but only approached signifi­
cance for gullibility (jd <.10). In both cases the Accomplice 
factor was not significant, nor was the interaction of it 
with the Test factor.
Overall, the convergent validity checks suggest that 
the manipulations produced the desired effects on awareness. 
The contingency information is especially clear-cut. The 
evaluation cues show a more complex pattern. While the essay 
item showed significant effects of both of the cues, the 
other measures indicated the effects of the Test manipulation 
only, and no measures yielded any significant interactions 
between the cues. Since the essay item was more sensitive to 
the Accomplice as well as to the Test manipulation, it seemed 
that it was the best measure of evaluation awareness.
Discriminant Validity
The data concerning discriminant validation allowed 
for the deduction concerning the orthogonality of the
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No Accom 4.451 4.216
Source 55 DF
T est 6.315 1
Accom 2.536 1
T X A .046 1
Error 634.001 380
MS F p <
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Source SS DF MS F P <
Test 14.789 1 14.789 6.462 .05
Accom 5.461 1 5.461 2.386
T X A 5.324 1 5.324 2.231
Error 869.701 380 2.287
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manipulations, a major aim of this research. By checking 
the impact of each of the factors on the corresponding mea­
sure of awareness for the other, it was possible to see if 
the manipulations produced confounding.
Contingency Information. The impact of contingency 
information on the measures of evaluation awareness produced 
a complicated pattern. On the first measure (10) the Infor­
mation group showed slightly less awareness (3.02) than did 
the No Information group (3.26). This difference was signifi­
cant beyond the .05 level. Since the effect of information 
was to enhance conditioning (results to be reported shortly), 
this result was particularly troublesome, since it suggested 
a passible confounding between evaluation awareness and con­
tingency awareness. However, the correlation between this 
measure and conditioning was only -.0477, which is not sig­
nificant. The AN0VA table for this measure of discriminant 
validation is reported in Table 5. The implications of this 
significant finding will be elaborated at the end of this 
section.
The second measure of evaluation awareness, the essay 
item, which produced clear relationships to the evaluation 
cues, bore no relationship to the Information manipulation.
Here the means were not significantly different from each 
other (£ = .061, d_f 1 /383).
The final two measures of evaluation awareness did 
show significant relationships to the Information factor, as 
shown by Table 6. On the Individualistic-Conforming dimension,
91
TABLE 5
EFFECT OF CONTINGENCY INFORMATION ON DULANEY- 









Source DF SS MS F P <
Cl 1 5.97 5.97 3.40 .05
Error 383 672.60 1 .756
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EFFECT OF CONTINGENCY INFORMATION ON ATTRIBUTED 
GULLIBILITY AND CONFORMITY




Source SS DF MS F P <
Cl 25.39 1 25.39 1 1 .24 .001
Error 865.30 383 2.259















the Information group had a mean of 4.97, showing more per­
ception of the conformity attribute than did the No Informa­
tion group,which had a mean of 4.45. This difference was 
significant beyond the .001 level (F, = 11.24, dJP = 1 /383 ).
On the Gullibility dimension, the Information manipu­
lation also showed an effect. Here the condition scared a 
mean of 4.66, whereas the NI scored 4.30. This suggests that 
the Information group saw the conditioning as more associated 
with gullibility than did the NI group. This effect was 
significant also beyond the .001 level (F_ = 7.45, d_f 1 /383 ). 
The implications for this finding will also be reviewed at 
the end of this section.
Evaluation Cues. The discriminant validation data 
for the evaluation cues were much more clear-cut, where 
neither of the cues showed significant relationships to the 
measures of contingency or hypothesis awareness. On both 
measures, the 2 x 2  analysis of variance yielded non-signifi­
cant effects of the cues, as well as non-significant inter­
actions .
Summary of Validity Checks
The most threatening data to the orthogonality of the 
evaluation cues and Information factor as independent vari­
ables concerned the significant effects of Cl on three of the 
four measures of evaluation awareness. Since the three 
evaluation awareness measures which were affected showed sig­
nificant or near significant effects for the Test cue, this
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suggested the possibility that the presence or absence of 
contingency information somehow influenced the effectiveness 
of the Test cue.
However, the evidence for this possibility is less 
than overwhelming since the three measures of evaluation 
awareness showed incongruent relationships with the Informa­
tion manipulation. That is, on the Dulaney item, l\lo Informa­
tion subjects indicated more effects of the Test, but on the 
Conformity and Gullibility attributions, it was the Informa­
tion subjects who showed more effects of the Test. Since the 
best measure of evaluation awarness showed no effects for the 
Information, it was concluded that the most reasonable inter­
pretation of the overall pattern of data was that the evalua­
tion cues and Information manipulations produced relatively 
orthogonal effects on the predicted components of awareness.
Refined Predictions Regarding Evaluation Cues. The 
data from the impact of the evaluation cues on EA suggest 
that these cues function additively in producing evaluation 
awareness, since in no cases did any interactions approach 
significance. Because of this finding, a refinement of the 
H2, as suggested on page 79, is necessary. Rather than 
predicting an interaction between the cues on conditioning, 
it was predicted that the cues would be additive, as shown 
in Figure 4.
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Type II: The Effects of Manipulations
on Conditioning
For the analyses which follow in this section, sub­
jects for whom no SD measure was available were dropped, 
yielding a total N of 322.
The first analysis performed involved a 2 x 2 x 2 x 
2 x 2  analysis with the three cue manipulations, high and low 
social desirability and sex of subject as the factors. This 
preliminary analysis was done because previous pilot work 
suggested the possibility of a sex of subject interaction with 
the Test cue. However, since the sex main effect was insig-. 
nificant, as well as all the interactions of it with any of 
the other factors, it is not presented, and all the analyses 
were collapsed across sex.
The means for conditioning for the 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 
analysis are presented in Table 7 and graphed in Figure 5, with 
significant differences indicated. The analysis of variance
summary table is shown in Table 8. Since a four-factor inter­
action was obtained the data were analyzed according to 
simple main effects of the four factors (Winer, 1962), which 
are presented in Table 9. Evidence for each of the related 
predictions from these simple main effects are presented in 
order.
H1. It was predicted that the significant simple effects of 
contingency information in increasing conditioning would be 


































Fig. 4. Refined predicted interaction of independent 
variables on conditioning based on manipulation checks.
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Fig. 5. Obtained means for conditioning with signifi­
cant simple effects indicated.
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SUMMARY TABLE FDR FOUR FACTOR ANALYSIS 
OF VARIANCE ON CONDITIONING, 
UNWEIGHTED MEANS ANALYSIS




228.139 1 228.139 36.195 .001
Test (T ) 61.139 1 61.139 9 .699 .001




.960 1 .960 .1 52
Cl X T 18.481 1 18.481 2.930 ( .10)
Cl X A 7.027 1 7.027 1.114
Cl X SD 19.453 1 19.453 3.086 ( .10)
T X A 19.851 1 19.851 3.149 ( .10)
T X SD 2.643 1 2.643 .41 8
A X SD 2.501 1 2.501 .396
Cl X T X A 1 .339 1 1 .339 .21 2
Cl X T X SD 1 .969 1 1 .969 .31 2
Cl X A X SD 1.191 1 1.191 .188
T X A X SD 1 .050 1 1 .050 .1 66
Cl X T X A X SD 41.732 1 41.732 6.62 .05
Error 1 ,922.0 305 6.303
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SIMPLE EFFECT5 DF TEST X ACCOMPLICE X INFORMATION X 
50CIAL DESIRABILITY INTERACTION ON CONDITIONING
I. Effect of Test
Source 55 DF MS F P <
Info-Accom-High
SD
29.36 1 29.360 4.658 .05
Info-Accom-Low
SD 50.69 1 50.692 8.042 .01
Info-No Accom- 
High 5D 28.01 1 28.012 4.444 .05
Info-No Accom- 
Low SD .45 1 .450 .071 NS
No Info-Accom- 
High SD 26.37 1 26.370 4.183 .05
No Info-Accom- 
Low 5D .099 1 .099 .01 57 NS
No Info-Accom- 
High SD 6.19 1 6.194 .983 NS
No Info-Accom- 
Low 5D 7.00 1 7.003 1.111 NS
Error 1922 305 6.303
II. Effect of Accomplice
Info-Test-High
SD 36.970 1 36.970 5.866 .05
Info-Test-Low SD 91 .723 1 91.723 14.552 .001
Info-No Test- 
High SD 35.451 1 35.451 5.625 .05
Info-No Test- 
Low SD 3.265 1 3.265 . .51 8 NS
No Info-Test- 
High SD 76.1 52 1 76.152 12.082 .001
1 □□
No Info-Test-
Low 5D 2.383 1 2.383 .378 NS
No Info-No 
Test-High SD 1 .21 6 1 1 .21 6 .1 93 NS
No Info-No 
Test-Low SD 20.295 1 20.295 3.220 NS
Error 1 922 305 6.303
III. Effect of Information
T est-Accom- 
High SD 9.531 1 9.531 1 .51 2 NS
T est-Accom- 
Low SD 3.450 1 3 .450 .547 NS
Test-No Accom- 
High SD .1 94 1 .1 94 .308 N5
Test-No Accom- 
Low SD 97.856 1 97.856 15.525 .001
No Test-Accom- 
High SD 11.362 1 11.362 1 .803 NS
No Test-Accom-Low 
SD 86.371 1 86.371 13.703 .001
No Test-No Accom 
High SD
i-
67.611 1 67.611 10.727 .01
No Test-No Accom 
Low SD
i—
42 .940 1 42.940 6.81 7 .01
Error 1 922 305 6.303
IV. Effect of Social Desirability
Info - Test- 
Accom 1 .510 1 1 .510 .240 NS
Info-T est-No 
Accom 22.331 1 22.331 3.543 .10
Info-No Test- 
Accom 8.584 1 8 .584 1 .302 NS
Info-Test-No
Accom 1 .588 1 1 .588 .252 NS
No Info-Test- 
Accom 6.036 1 6 .036 .958 NS
No Info-Test- 
No Accom 22.331 1 22.331 3.543 .10
No Info-No Test- 
No Accom .1 68 1 .1 68 .026 NS
No Info-No Test- 
No Accom 8.957 1 8.957 1 .421 NS
Error 1 922 305 6.303
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numerous when both evaluation cues were present, and of 
intermediate number when only one evaluation cue was present.
The evidence for this prediction was for the most 
part supportive. In both High and Low 5D conditions, infor­
mation was not effective in increasing conditioning when both 
cues were present, was sometimes effective when only one cue 
was present and was always effective in increasing condition­
ing when no cues were present. The contrary evidence arose 
from the instances in which the information was effective in 
the one cue condition. As can be seen in Figure 5, these 
occurred among Low SD rather than High SD subjects.
H2. The second prediction was that the significant simple 
effects of evaluation cues in decreasing conditioning would 
be more numerous in I conditions than in l\II conditions.
The evidence for this prediction is listed separately 
for each evaluation cue. First of all, with respect to the 
test cue, Figure 5 shows that it was effective in reducing 
conditioning in the NI conditions only once (that was in the 
Accomplice-High SD condition), but in the I conditions, the 
test was effective three of the four times (everywhere except 
the No Accomplice-Low SD condition). This series of dif­
ferences supports the prediction, and the instances of when 
it was ineffective is consistent with the hypothesis. That 
is, the test made no difference in the I condition only when 
the accomplice was absent, among Low SD subjects, but it was 
effective in reducing conditioning in the NI condition only 
when the Accomplice was present, among High SD subjects.
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The evidence for the Accomplice simple effects were 
also supportive, where it can be seen that the accomplice 
was effective in reducing conditioning three of the four 
times when information was given (everywhere except in the 
Lo.\/ 5D-No Test condition, which is where the least effect was 
expected). Similarly, it was effective in reducing condi­
tioning only once in the i\)I condition, and that was in the 
High 5D-Test condition, where the strongest effects were 
expected.
In general the evidence for the predicted additivity 
of the evaluation cues was not supported in that, as Figure 5 
indicates, the cues interacted with respect to their effects 
on conditioning. Among HSD subjects in the NI condition, the 
Accomplice was effective only when the Test was present, and 
the Test was effective only when the Accomplice was present. 
Among Low SD subjects in the I condition, this pattern also 
occurred.
H3. The third prediction was that the significant simple 
effects of the social-approval factor would be most numerous 
when information and evaluation cues were present, least 
numerous when information and evaluation cues were absent, 
and of intermediate number when some but not all of the cues 
were present.
In general the data did not support this specific 
hypothesis. As Table 9 indicates, the 5D factor did not 
produce any significant simple effects, and approached sig­
nificance in only two cases. The first was in the
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Information-Test-No Accomplice condition in which High SD 
subjects did show less conditioning than Low 5D subjects, as 
predicted. However, the other case was incongruent with the 
prediction, where, in the (\lo Information-Test-No Accomplice 
condition, High SD subjects showed more conditioning than Low 
SD subjects. Neither of these conditions were those in which 
the largest effects of SD were expected (when all cues present) 
and since one was in the wrong direction, the evidence is not 
at all supportive.
However, an alternative way of viewing the simple 
effects data does suggest support for the notion that the 
effects of the cues differ for Low SD and High SD subjects.
That is, in line with the conceptualized functioning of SD, 
one would expect the evaluation cues to be more effective 
among High SD than among Low 5D subjects, and Figure 5 shows 
that this was clearly the case. The accomplice was effec­
tive in reducing conditioning among High SD subjects every­
where except in the No Test-No Information condition, whereas 
it was effective among Low 5D subjects only in the Test- 
Information Condition. Similarly, the Test was effective in 
reducing conditioning among High SD subjects everywhere except 
in the No Accomplice-No Information condition, whereas among 
Low SD subjects, it was only effective in the Accomplice- 
Information condition. This pattern fits very well with the 
notion that SD interacts with the effects of the evaluation 
cues.
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However, with regard to the information cue, the 
simple effects do not seem to fit this pattern. In fact, 
just the apposite effect occurred. That is, the information 
was effective in enhancing conditioning in Low SD subjects 
three of four times, everywhere except when both evaluation 
cues were present, whereas it was effective only once among 
the High SD subjects (that was when neither evaluation cue 
was present). These results are considered further in the 
discussion section.
Proportion of Variance Accounted For
As presented in Table 8 (p. 98), where the design is 
analyzed into the sources of variance, the total proportion 
of variance accounted forwith the manipulations and social 
desirability measure is .2379. This estimate was derived by 
adding all the significant mean squares in the analysis and 
dividing by the total mean square.
Type III: The Study of Awareness
The intercorrelations between the awareness measures 
collected from the post-experimental questionnaire are pre­
sented in Table 10. As will be shown, the data supported the 
prediction that hypothesis awareness is necessary for the 
operation of evaluation cues, but the multiplicative network 




INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG AWARENESS MEASURES AT 
SELECTED LEVELS OF HYPOTHESIS AWARENESS
CA HA EA MC-H MC-E HA X MCH HA X MCE DV
CA .709 .004 -.141 -.264 .430 .579 .471
HA .044 -.192 -.271 .699 .856 .479
EA -.077 -.1 02 -.01 9 -.007 .332
MCH -.227 .1 51 .308 -.247
MCE .411 -.033 -.308
HA X MCH .724 .1 95






Critical values : .10=.164; .05=.195; .01=.254
Items from post- 
Item Construct experimental questionnaire
CA Contingency Awareness #6 and #7
HA Hypothesis Awareness #8 and #9
EA Evaluation Hypothesis #1 1 and #12
MC--H Motivation to Comply 
(Help) #15
MC--E Motivation to Comply 
(Expect) #14
HA X MCH Hypothesis Awareness multiplied by 
Comply— Help
Motivation to
HA X MCE Hypothesis Awareness multiplied by 
Comply— Expect
Motivation to
DV Dependent Variable (Conditioning)
Evidence for the Central Role of 
Hypothesis Awareness
As can be seen from Table 11, which presents the 
correlations between the evaluation cue manipulations, evalu­
ation awareness, and the motivation to comply measures with 
conditioning at selected levels of hypothesis awareness, 
hypothesis awareness was critical in mediating the effect of 
evaluation cues. When hypothesis awareness was essentially 
absent (HA less than 3), the correlationsbetween conditioning 
and the evaluation cues and awareness were not significantly 
different from zero. However, when hypothesis awareness was 
present (HA more than 5), the correlations were significant. 
This pattern of findings suggests that the effects of evalua­
tion apprehension depend upon the prior presence of hypothe­
sis awareness.
The simple effects of the evaluation cues at I vs.
NI conditions would lead one to expect this kind of pattern. 
However, the interaction from the analysis of variance data 
alone would not enable the specification of which type of 
awareness plays the more central role, since it could also 
be inferred that the effects of contingency information depend 
upon the prior reception of evaluation cues. The correla­
tional data derived from examining the effects of contingency 
awareness do enable the delineation of an asymmetrical rela­
tionship, however, since the converse analysis did not pro­
duce the same pattern of effects. That is, hypothesis aware­
ness played a significant role at selected levels of evalua-
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TABLE 11
INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG AWARENESS MEASURES
I. When Hypothesis Awareness = 6 i□ r 7 (n = 252)*
EA-




Cont MCE MCH SD DV
Test -.071 .171 .297 .164 .000 .156 .027 .038 .211
Accom .033 .103 .015 .080 .050 .089 .069 .283
EA-MC .1 32 .288 .292 .139 .01 8 .078 .1 31
EA-Essay .311 .294 .106 .114 .060 .448
EA-Gull .372 .1 38 .060 .034 .226
EA-Cont .016 .094 .040 .181




II. When Hypothesis Awareness = o, 1 or 2 (n = 71) **
T est .095 .042 .211 .01 8 .01 5 .023 .000 .011 .014
Accom .000 .148 .106 .161 .141 .099 .242 .1 53
EA-MC .097 .084 .096 .109 .365 .099 .059
EA-Essay .249 .274 .229 .061 .022 .005
EA-Gull .561 .059 .100 .105 .039
EA-Cont .041 .029 .010 .053




*Critical values: dkf = 100; .10=.164; .05=.195; .01=.254
**Critical values: d_f = 70; .10=.195; .05 = .232; .01=.303
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tion awareness. When subjects were aware of a negative 
evaluation (EA at -2 or -1 on the essay measure), the corre­
lation between hypothesis awareness and conditioning was 
.3208. When evaluation awareness was in the positive direc­
tion (EA at +1 or +2 on the essay measure), the correlation 
was .5460, and when subjects indicated no awareness (EA at 0), 
the correlation was .4817. This pattern is exactly as one 
would expect, in that the positive awareness should enhance 
the tendency for subjects to cooperate with their hypothesis 
awareness, and the negative direction should mitigate this 
tendency. Overall, these data form a remarkably clear pattern 
in suggesting that the effects of evaluation awareness depend 
upon the subject knowing what he is supposed to do in the 
experiment, and that the direction of evaluation awareness 
enhances or detracts from the subjects cooperation with that 
knowledge.
Evidence for the Dulaney Model
On the other hand, the more elaborate theoretical 
network derived from the Dulaney paradigm did not receive 
much support. The multiplied HA x MC term did not bear a 
greater relationship to the conditioning response than did 
the awareness of contingencies or evaluation. As can be 
seen from Table 11, the HA x MC terms bore little relation­
ship to the dependent variable (.195 for HA x and .314
for HA x MC^.). These correlations were both lower than the 
relationship of CA to the dependent variable (.471) as well
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TABLE 12
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SD AND EA AT 5EPARATE 
EVALUATION CUE CONDITIONS
I NI
No Test -.0207 .0982
T est -.2941 .1 426
I NI
No Test -.2031 .1294
T est -.1495 .1279










II. When HA X MCH out:
.373
DVCA HA X MCH
.002
EA
Fig. 6. Correlations between model components when HA 
X MC partialled out.
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as the relationship of EA to the dependent variable (.332).
Other predictions based on this model also failed to 
be supported. The partialling of the multiplicative HA x MC 
terms did not reduce the relationship between the DV and EA 
or the DV and CA to zero. As Figure 6 (p.109) shows, par­
tialling left significant relationships between conditioning 
and contingency awareness (.437 for MC^ and .373 for MC^) as 
well as between conditioning and evaluation awareness .(.343
for MCr and .354 for MCU). t n
Thus it appears that the effects of contingency and 
evaluation awareness do not operate through a mediating pro­
cess involving a multiplicative relationship of hypothesis 
awareness and motivation to comply. Reasons for the failure 
of this model to adequately describe the data, as well as 
the discrepancy between the model and the data for the central 
role of hypothesis awareness are dealt with in the discussion.
Proportion of Variance Accounted for by 
the Correlational Data
When the correlations between the awareness measures
and the conditioning scores were subjected to a multiple
2regression analysis, the result was a multiple R of .402, 
indicating that all of the awareness measures together accounted 
for about 40 percent of the variance.
5ince experimental manipulations accounted for about 
24 percent of the variance, a step-wise multiple regression 
analysis of all of the awareness measures and manipulations
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was run to estimate the total proportion of unique variance
accounted for in the conditioning scores by all of the vari-
2
ables in the study. The multiple R yielded from this analy­
sis was .449.
VI. DISCUSSION
The pattern of findings just described indicates that 
many, though not all, of the predictions were supported. The 
manipulation checks suggested that the hypothesis and evalua­
tion cues were successfully manipulated. The major pre­
dictions concerning the interaction of cues with subject need 
for approval were mostly supported, with the exception of a 
few unanticipated series of effects which necessitate.- some 
explication below. Finally, the study of post-experimental 
awareness suggested that hypothesis awareness is a critical 
component in mediating the effects of evaluation cues, but 
that the evidence for the Dulaney model was not supportive.
Several issues emerge from the pattern of results 
obtained in this investigation. The question of the relative 
importance of subject roles, difficulties in measuring evalu­
ation awareness and its relationship to social desirability, 
problems in interpreting the motivation to comply measures, 
the controversy regarding the degree to which subjects engage 
in conscious decision making in this paradigm, and recommenda­
tions for future research are discussed.
Experimental Evidence for Subject Roles
The pattern of data described for the convergent and 
discriminant validity checks of the major independent varia­
bles of evaluation cues and contingency information suggests
that in this paradigm, the two types of cues were manipulated 
successfully. This allowed for the empirical test of the 
relative importance of the good and apprehensive roles, which 
were found to be a systematic function of the number and 
type of cues found in the experimental situation. That is, 
contingency information clearly increased conditioning, indi­
cating support for the good-subject role, except when evalu­
ation cues were numerous and subjects were high in need for 
social approval. On the other hand, the evaluation cues 
decreased conditioning, except when no information was given 
and subjects were low in need for social pproval. On the 
whole, the effects of the cues interacted in a very consistent 
pattern with the social desirability factor to suggest that 
cooperation or resistance with the demands of an experiment 
depend upon the cues in the situation as well as on individual 
characteristics of the subjects. In this sense, the term 
"role" seems an inappropriate label for the extent to which 
subjects cooperate, since it suggests that it might be trans- 
situational as well as independent of the unique characteris­
tics of the subject. Instead, this research has shown that 
cooperation depends very clearly on a complex interaction 
between specific features of the experimental situation and 
aspects of the individual in that situation.
Overall, the predictions were well supported. How­
ever, there were a number of inconsistencies in the data 
which deserve closer attention.
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Relationship of 5D Factor to Manipulated Cues
One majpr series of disconfirming findings within the 
four factor interaction occurred with the effects of SD. In 
contradiction to the hypothesis that the 5D factor would be 
more effective as more cues were introduced, what in fact 
occurred was that the SD factor showed no significant effects 
at all. Those places where it approached significance were 
not in the conditions where the strongest effects were pre­
dicted, nor were they always in the predicted direction.
However, as reported in the results section, considera­
tion ofthe simple effects of the evaluation cues at different 
SD levels shows that a pattern of results was obtained that 
was clearly consistent with the underlying conceptualization 
of the role of SD in the present paradigm. That is, evalua­
tion cues were more effective for High 5D subjects than for 
Low SD subjects, and the instances in which they were ineffec­
tive in each case were those which would be predicted when 
this perspective is taken.
The fact that the Information simple effects showed 
an apposite pattern to the evaluation cue effects seem con­
tradictory to the above pattern. That is, the simple effects 
of information showed that Low SD subjects were more often 
affected by the information than were High SD subjects. This 
finding seems to also contradict past research which suggests 
that High SD subjects are more cooperative in a conditioning 
experiment (Crowne and Strickland, 1962).
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However, a look at the conditions where High and Low 
SD subjects showed significantly more conditioning when con­
tingency information was present suggests a plausible explana­
tion. Specifically, High SD subjects were only affected by 
the Information when both the Test and Accomplice were 
absent, and Low SD subjects were affected by the Information 
everywhere except when both the Test and Accomplice were 
present. This pattern is very similar to the effects of 
Information at different evaluation cue levels, since the 
Information was most effective when the cues were absent, and 
least effective when they were both present. It seems very 
plausible, then, that the SD factor could be operating as a 
"chronic" evaluation cue, that is, a heightened propensity to 
become evaluation aware with which the subject enters the 
laboratory. If this were the case, rather than facilitating 
the effects of the Information cue, it would be expected that 
the SD factor would mitigate against it, just as the other 
evaluation cues tended to do. This overall pattern suggests 
a very consistent picture, supporting the rde of SD in inter­
action with the cue manipulations.
Thus, the series of findings from the simple effects 
of the cues at different SD levels seems to contradict those 
obtained for the simple effects of SD at different cue levels. 
One possible explanation for this incongruency involves the 
relative weakness of the SD factor in comparison to the 
strength of the cue factors. That is, the various cues pro­
duced very powerful effects on behavior, as shown by the main
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effects from Table 8 (p. 98), but the 5D factor did not.
Dne reason for the relative impotency of the SD 
factor could involve the operationalization of SD which very
likely hindered the possibility of it showing significant
3effects. Inspection of Figure 2 shows that the distribution 
of 5D scores was fairly leptokurtic. Over half of the sub­
jects scored within four points of each other, and were thus 
divided into High and Low SD conditions on the basis of a 
fairly arbitrary criterion (median split). If the definition 
of the SD factor had involved trichotomization rather than 
dichotomization, 140 scorers who ranged within 3 points would 
have been eliminated from the High and Low conditions and a 
more powerful SD factor would have been likely to result. This 
procedure would most likely increase power by increasing 
between cell variance relative to within cell variance, since 
the loss of degrees of freedom with large N research would not 
change the error term a great deal. This possibility could be 
easily tested by future research, and if the middle third was 
retained as a middle level, the possibility for checking curvi­
linear functions of the SD factor would also be gained. This 
trichotomization was not undertaken in the present research 
since a three level factor was felt to add too much complexity 
to an already complex design. However, the present findings sug­
gest this procedure would have substantial payoff for future 
research.
One difficulty with this explanation involves the 
fact that the SD factor did not approach significance in the 
multiple cue conditions where the strongest simple effects 
were predicted to occur.
11 6
This interpretation suggests that the SD scale is 
validly differentiating subjects based on their tendency to 
pick up and respond to evaluation cues, and rests on the 
assumption that the High SD subjects are more evaluation 
aware than the Low SD subjects. Interestingly, this link in
the rationale does not receive support from the awareness
data, since the correlation between the SD measure and evalu­
ation awareness as measured by the essay item was -.0076, 
which is not significant. (The SD measure also failed to 
correlate significantly with the other three measures of 
evaluation awareness, all of which were deemed poorer mea­
sures on the basis of convergent and discriminant validity 
data.)
Since the essay item received empirical support for 
its convergent and discriminant validity, the lack of rela­
tionship between it and the SD measure is a troublesome 
incongruency. Perhaps the SD scale is at fault. What empiri­
cal evidence exists for the 5D scale as a valid measure of
the tendency to be affected by evaluation cues?
Fortunately, this measure of need for approval has 
been subjected to considerable construct validation testing, 
in the 1964 text describing the development and empirical 
investigations of the scale, Marlow and Crowne report that 
the SD scale was predictive of behavior in a wide variety of 
social approval situations. For example, compared to sub­
jects scoring low in need for social approval, high SD sub­
jects were found to 1) report more favorable attitudes toward
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a boring experimental task to an inquiring experimenter, 2) 
conform more to inaccurate perceptions of auditory stimuli 
given by a group of accomplices in an Asch-type conformity 
situation, 3) give more common word associations, 4) report 
less taboo words in a perceptual defense paradigm, 5) show 
more attitude change after role-playing, 6) be more defensive 
against hostility by being more influenced by a euphoric 
accomplice after instigation to aggression in a Schachter- 
Singer type of waiting experiment, 7) terminate psychotherapy 
earlier even though their therapists regard them as more 
defensive and afraid of social rejection, and 8) show higher 
need for affiliation on a projective measure, but be less 
liked by peers. More recent research by others has replicated 
and extended these findings to other social approval situa­
tions (Hollender, 1 969 ; McLaughlin &. Hewitt, 1972; Meisels &. 
Ford, 1 965; Miller, Doob, Butler, &. Marlow, 1 965; Posavaac,
1971 ; Salman, 1 962) .
Most relevant to the present research is the chapter 
which relates the findings from verbal conditioning studies 
where it is reported that high need for approval subjects 
showed greater verbal conditioning in the Greenspoon para­
digm, but only when the reinforcement involved social approval. 
This finding has been replicated by others (Epstein, 1964).
Thus, evidence from a wide variety of research paradigms con­
verges with the conditioning experiment to suggest that those 
who score high on the SD scale are more concerned about socially 
approved behavior in an experiment, and monitor their
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behavior accordingly. This network of findings would lead 
one to expect this scale measures individual differences in 
the propensity for evaluation apprehension in the sense in 
which Rosenberg originally defined the term.
The studies in which Rosenberg has used the scale 
are less supportive, however. While the data he reports with 
his picture rating paradigm (1969) are somewhat sketchy for 
the SD measure, it appears that in one study, evaluation cues 
did seem to be more effective for High SD subjects, at least 
when the cues suggested that mature people tend to like the 
faces. When the cue involved disliking, however, Low SD sub­
jects did not confirm the relationship. However, the most 
serious problems involved in the results from a second study, 
where subjects were told that bored and inefficient per­
formance on a very simple experimental task was a correlate 
of maturity. In this case, Low SD subjects produced lower 
scores than High SD subjects, who performed similarly to a 
control group without the evaluation cue. While Rosenberg 
interpreted this as due to credibility problems of the manipu­
lation, he provided no such empirical evidence, and we are 
forced to conclude that the SD scale simply did not function 
as one would have predicted on the basis of the constructs 
involved.
One reason for this might relate to the present 
research in which the SD factor also functioned less than 
perfectly. That is, in contrast to most successful demon­
strations of differences between High and Low SD subjects to
approval cues, both Rosenberg's and the present paradigm 
gathered data from subjects in a group situation. One would 
expect conformity to socially approved norms to be greatest 
for the individual acting alone in the experiment, since the 
presence of other subjects could weaken the effects. For 
example, to the extent that High SD subjects could use other 
subjects as reference information, or to allay evaluation 
anxiety, one would expect the effects of the SD factor to be 
weakened. Future research could test this possibility by 
running the same paradigm with individual subjects and com­
paring the effects of the SD factor when subjects are run in 
groups.
In sum, it seems that there are some inconsistencies 
in findings with the SD scale, most notably from the labora­
tory of Rosenberg himself, but that overall a large body of 
evidence can be marshalled for its support. Given the syste­
matic way in which the cues interacted with the scale in the 
present study, it seems difficult to dismiss it as an inade­
quate measure.
□n the other hand, this research went considerably 
further than others in developing a measure of evaluation 
awareness which satisfied both interjudge reliability and 
convergent and discriminance validity criteria. Since the 
measure also correlated with the dependent variable in the 
predicted direction, it appeared to be an adequate measure 
of evaluation awareness. Thus, evidence for the validity 
of both the EA and SD measure is convincing, and the lack of
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relationship between them in the present study is puzzling.
One possibility for this finding is the manner in 
which the correlation was calculated, that is, across all 
subjects in all conditions. One would expect that the SD 
factor might bear different relationships to EA in different 
cue conditions. Negative correlations would be expected in 
conditions where the E cue was strongest. In other condi­
tions one would expect positive and zero correlations, and 
collapsing across all conditions could thus produce no corre­
lation even though meaningful relationships existed. To 
check this possibility, the correlation between SD and EA was 
recalculated at separate cue conditions, and these coefficients 
are presented in Table 12. A pattern of positive and negative 
correlations did appear, although not the pattern which would 
be predicted from the above rationale. Negative correlations 
were found throughout the Information conditions, whereas 
positive correlations appeared when information was absent.
This finding suggests that the role of SD on mediating 
the effects of evaluation cues may depend upon the relative 
saliency of hypothesis cues. When the experimenter's hypothe­
sis is clear, High 5D subjects are more likely to discern 
the negative implication of conforming to it, but when the 
hypothesis is not clear, conditioning is not more likely to 
be discerned as an instance of conformity by High SD subjects.
This is an interesting pattern of data since it sug­
gests that the effects of cues on awareness may take different 
functions depending upon the presence of other factors. In
the current study, the investigation of the cues on awareness 
was undertaken to provide manipulation checks of both con­
vergent and discriminant validity and as such went a great 
deal further than previous research establishing validity of 
the manipulations. However, these analyses could be limited 
in that they were basically main effect analyses, that is, 
based on single factor designs. What the above finding 
suggests is that it is possible that interactions might emerge 
if evaluation cues and information factors as well as the 5D 
factor were employed in the same design on the measures of 
awareness. If such interactions did emerge, the information 
about the effects of these cues on awareness would be con­
siderably richer.
This methodology could help to answer a beguiling 
question which has repeatedly caught the attention of 
researchers in this field, and that is whether these sorts of 
evaluation cues affect subject behavior by affecting the sub­
ject's perception of the situation, or merely his willingness 
to cooperate with his perceptions. Since it has already been 
shown that the evaluation cues did not influence the subject's 
hypothesis awareness or contingency awareness, part of this 
question has already been tentatively answered in this research, 
at least with respect to main effect analyses. However, since 
this correlational analysis shows that information does affect 
the way in which the subject's need for approval relates his 
evaluation awareness, it could be that a more elaborate analy­
sis of the awareness measures might indicate ways in which
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the subject's need for approval mediates perception. Thus, 
there seems to be the possible distinction between the 
chronic definition of evaluation cues in terms of SD, which 
does interact with information cues to affect evaluation 
awareness, and the acute definition of evaluation cues in 
terms of the test and confederate which does not interact 
with information cues to affect evaluation awareness. This 
possibility could be checked by employing the four factor 
analysis on the various measures of awareness from the post- 
experimental questionnaire and comparing these results to 
the four factor analysis on awareness.
Evidence for the Multiplicative Model of Awareness
The evidence from the experimental data suggested 
that the hypothesis and evaluation cues did operate in an 
interactive manner in that hypothesis awareness enhanced the 
effects of evaluation cues, and that when evaluation aware­
ness was especially strong, it cancelled the effects of hypothe­
sis cues. The evidence from correlational data gathered from 
selected samples of subjects at high and low levels of hypothe­
sis awareness further indicated that this interaction was pro­
duced by an asymmetrical relationship between hypothesis and 
evaluation awareness, hypothesis awareness playing a more 
central role by being necessary for the effectiveness of 
evaluation cues, while the conversewas not true. That is, 
at selected levels of evaluation awareness, and especially 
when evaluation awareness was zero, hypothesis awareness still
enhanced conditioning, whereas when hypothesis awareness was 
at zero, evaluation awareness did not relate to conditioning. 
Thus, the correlational and experimental data converge to 
verify a model of subject cooperation in which the subject 
becomes aware of the experimenter's hypothesis and then 
decides to cooperate with it on the basis of evaluation cues 
present in the situation.
Unfortunately the multiplicative model of awareness 
derived from Dulaney's Theory of Propositional Control failed 
to complement the above set of findings. The HA x MC term 
did not correlate more highly with the dependent variable 
than components of the term, or more highly than did the 
exogenous components, CA and EA. What explanations exist for 
this discrepant set of findings?
The Dimension of Hypothesis Awareness
Since the subsample analysis involved the dichotomiza- 
tion of hypothesis awareness, whereas the partialling analy­
sis involved the use of the entire dimension, it is possible 
that the use of the entire dimension introduced error into 
the system, error which was unnecessary and clouded the true 
relationships from view. A controversy has previously arisen 
over the proper dimensionalization of hypothesis awareness, 
and Page (1969) has dichotomized the component, basically 
because of the bimodal distribution which the term has taken. 
As can be seen from Table 13, the distribution which both 
contingency and hypothesis awareness took in the present study 
was far from normal although not necessarily very bimodal.
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TABLE 13
DISTRIBUTIONS OF CONTINGENCY AND 
HYPOTHESIS AWARENESS









2 3 1 6
3 36 1 9
4 6 31
5 39 1 2
6 243 252
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In that bath components were highly skewed to the left (with 
63 percent and 65 percent of the subjects scoring full aware­
ness on CA and HA, respectively), the assumption of normal 
distribution for a Pearson correlation was not met, and 
simplification of the distribution by dichotomization seemed 
appropriate.
Further, the original rationale for the multiplied 
HA x MC component rested largely on the conceptualization of 
these terms when they were scored as zero. That is, if either 
term were zero, the resulting conditioning should also be 
zero. 5ince the dimensionalized HA component rarely reached 
a zero level, even though scores of 1 or 2 would indicate 
little or no awareness, HA was dichotomized into scores of 
□ and 1 .
Hence, the HA x MC terms were recalculated using a 
dichotomized HA term where subjects scoring below 3 were 
assigned a score of □ and subjects scoring above 5 a score of 
1. These new terms (HA^ x and x MD^-) produced a
pattern of partials which are indicated in Figure 7. As can 
be seen, this rescoring did little to improve the empirical 
status of the model. The new terms only correlated .2793 
and .3735 with the dependent variable, and partialling them 
from the CA-DV relationship still left it at .3579 and .4123 
(for MCj_| and MC^, respectively).
Thus, while the dichomization of HA improved somewhat 
the role of the multiplicative term in the model, the size of 











Fig. 7. Correlations between model components when 
HA scored as a dichotomy and resulting HA X MC term partialled 
out.
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model. Apparently, the failure of the model to attain 
empirical support was not due to the scoring of hypothesis 
awareness.
The Validity of the Motivation to 
Comply Measures
5ince the problem did not seem to be located in the 
scaring of hypothesis awareness, the next suspect was the 
motivation to comply measure. Indeed, previous research in 
other laboratories suggests that motivation to comply may be 
an extremely difficult construct to measure.
The first example of these problems appears in a 
thesis by one of Dulaney's students (Bottom, 1972) where the 
attempt to manipulate MC resulted in a nonconfirmation of 
Dulaney's theory. The study used a conditioning task in which 
color choices were the responses to be conditioned and the 
manipulation of MC was attempted by informing each subject 
that "so far we have learned that in this task the more nor­
mal, the less neurotic the subjects are, the more they very 
much want to choose whatever color they think they are sup­
posed to choose [p. 45]." While Dulaney described this 
attempt to manipulate MC as one that "failed rather badly" 
(Dulaney, personal communication, 1973), it seemed from the 
analysis of the post-experimental reports that this was not 
precisely the case. Subjects were asked "When choosing one 
kind of color or another over the last 20 trials, how much did 
you want to choose whatever you might have thought you were 
supposed to choose?" and responses were scored from +1 (want
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very much) to -1 (very much did not). The data for this item ' 
show that the manipulation was indeed successful in that the 
people told that "it is neurotic not to want to do what's 
expected" had a mean score of .61; those told the opposite, 
that "it is neurotic to want to do what's expected" had a 
mean score of .07; and those told that less neurotic people 
don't care" (a neutral condition) had a mean of .43. This 
difference was significant beyond the .001 level, indicating 
that this information did create different reports of motiva­
tion to comply with the experimental hypothesis.
it was described as unsuccessful because using the reports of 
MC in the formula
did not increase the accuracy of predicitng either behavioral 
intention or the dependent variable. In fact, the prediction 
system was more successful without the MC term than it was 
when it was included in the formula. Because of this, it was 
concluded that the true value of MC might have been 1, sug­
gesting that MC might not have really been manipulated. How­
ever, this is a very weak explanation, since subjects did
However, even though the manipulation was successful,
Contingency
Awareness








report different MC values across conditions which differed 
in the expected direction. The conclusions seem unsatisfac­
tory, but bear some relationship to a further study of MC by 
Uleman (1971b).
In this experiment, the attempt was made to heighten 
MC by telling subjects that good performance in a verbal con­
ditioning task would be rewarded with an important position 
in a future group decision hierarchy. Furthermore, chronic 
levels of MC were measured with a Thematic Apperception type 
of need for Influence and Need for Power measure (Uleman,
1966). The results of this study show that the motivational 
variables affected conditioning, but not through the operation 
of Behavioral Intention, as Dulaney had specified. Instead, 
subjectswho reported they wanted to get the reinforcement con­
ditioned faster than those with low MC, even when the behavioral 
intention was zero. That is, the relationship between MC and 
DV was positive without the mediating influence of behavioral 
intention, suggesting that motivation to comply may not be so 
obviously anchored in awareness as are other aspects of the 
verbal conditioning situation such as contingency awareness 
and behavioral hypothesis.
Uleman's explanation for this unexpected finding 
involved the "self-perception phenomenon" which Bern (1967) 
has offered to explain self-knowledge about internal processes. 
Briefly, the position states that self-attributions about such 
things as attitudes and motives are based on our own external 
behavior more than internal processes which we can directly
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experience. Thus, when subjects are asked about contingency 
awareness or hypothesis awareness, they can refer to external 
events in the environment and the awareness of these events 
is easy to report. However, when they are asked about purely 
internal events, such as intentions and motivations, they have 
no direct external referrent, and must use a variety of 
potentially artifactual information to come up with an infer­
ence for the experimenter. In this particular case, Uleman 
suggests that the positive MC-DV relationship when behavioral 
intention was zero may have been caused by subjects with 
moderate MC who conditioned, but inferred little behavioral 
intention because they did not fully condition.
While in the present study it was not possible to 
check the operation of MC through behavioral intention, there 
are other reasons to suspect that it did not measure motiva­
tion in a valid manner. In the present study, the situational 
manipulation of evaluation cues should have affected motiva­
tion to comply through the mediating effect1.-; on EA. How­
ever, the relationship between these variables was quite low, 
as shown in Table 10 (p. 104). Evaluation awareness corre­
lated only -.0779 with MC|_j and -.1021 with MC^.. These corre­
lations indicate that whatever the MC measures were doing, 
they were not measuring the motivation to cooperate which was 
hypothesized to be mediated through evaluation awareness.
While the lack of correlation between evaluation 
awareness and the MC terms is a threatening finding to the 
validity of the MC measures, the most devastating evidence
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regards the low correlation between the MC measures and the 
dependent variable among hypothesis aware subjects. As indi­
cated in Table 11 (p. 106), these correlations were only
.2171 for MC^ . and .2349 for MC|_|. While these correlations 
are significant, the fact that they are not higher suggests 
that subjects were not indicating their cooperation, even 
when they had full knowledge of the demands, and were con­
ditioning. Even subjects who conditioned fully (scores on 
the dependent variable at 6 or 7) only indicated a mean coopera­
tion of 2.95, and the standard deviation among this group of 
1 .627 on the MC^ - measure shows that they are considerably 
variable in their reports of cooperation. (The mean and 
standard deviation for the MC|_| measure were similar, 2.87 and 
1.743, respectively.)
These relationships between MC and EA do contradict 
those reported by Page (1971) in a study of evaluation appre­
hension on verbal conditioning. He gave a personality test 
dealing with conformity as the evaluation cue manipulation, 
and measured evaluation awareness by asking subjects "what 
was the purpose of the personality test you took at the 
beginning?" While his measure of MC was not clearly spelled 
out, he reported positive effects. While only one out of his 
14 EA subjects reported cooperation, 5 of his 8 non-evalua­
tion aware subjects did, producing a significant relationship 
between EA and MC in his study. Further, the relationship 
between MC and the presence or absence of the personality test 
approached significance (p ^ .1□) where twice as many subjects
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in the no test group reported cooperation than did those in 
the test group.
The reason for the discrepancy between Page's study 
and the present one regarding the validity of the MC term 
remains to be tested. An obvious possibility is the differ­
ence in experimental paradigms, the verbal conditioning allow­
ing a subject more responses, and thus more data on which 
to infer his cooperation with the hypothesis. It could be 
that the one response aspect of the classical conditioning 
task does not allow the subject enough information about his 
own behavior to extract an estimation of his degree of com­
pliance. This may be the reason why the MC term has received 
partial support from Dulaney (1968) although in this case, 
the attempt was not made to manipulate motivation.
It could also be that the precise wording of the MC 
measures may significantly affect the responses, although 
the two variations used in the current research produced 
similar sets of data throughout many different analyses. 
Without knowing the exact wording of Page's item, it is diffi­
cult to know what subjects were reporting about themselves. / 
However, since the MC^ . measure of the present study was pre­
cisely the one used by Dulaney, it is difficult to attribute 
all of the failure to this problem.
In any case, it seems reasonable that the MC measures 
would be among the most difficult components of post- 
experimental awareness to interpret, and even Page, who has 
been relatively successful in dealing with this term has
repeatedly acknowledged his hesitations in making inferences 
from it (1970, 1971, 1973). Page notes that many subjects 
in his studies indicated their reservations about answering 
the item, and even when reporting full cooperation, were 
"reticent to call it deliberate." This converges with the 
many subject reports from the present study where unsolicited 
elaborations of their answers were written alongside the MC 
items. Often these explanations told of the subject's coopera­
tion, but disallowed that they were purposely trying to "fudge 
the data" or respond in that manner only because the experi­
menter expected them to. In other words, it seems likely 
that subjects can and do give valid reports of their various 
aspects of awareness (contingency, hypothesis, evaluation) 
but that a description of their motivation is going beyond 
their introspective capacities. This seems very reasonable 
from the perspective of the subject, in that successful 
problem solving in the conditioning paradigm would seem to 
depend upon his very conscious awareness of the correct con­
tingency and hypothesis. However, while participating in the 
experiment, he is not directly concerned with the question of 
his cooperation or intention, and it is not until the experi­
menter asks him later that these attributions have any reality 
at all. At this point they are likely to be greatly influ­
enced by the precise wording of the question, and have an 
ambiguous status which would not be systematically related 
to other components of awareness or to situational manipula­
tions.
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In this regard, the present findings are congruent
with speculations by both Orne and Rosenberg about the degree
to which subject motivation is verbalizable to the subject.
Orne has recently stated that
It was never my impression, except in rare cases, that 
the mechanisms by which demand characteristics affect 
subject's behavior were those of willful or conscious 
compliance— the subject is not being compliant in any 
useful sense of that word. Rather he is behaving in ways 
that, unthinkingly, he perceives as correct or appropriate 
[1970, p. 225].
And, regarding the relationship between evaluation 
awareness and motivation to comply, Rosenberg has taken a 
similar position regarding the ability of subjects to verba­
lize their cooperation, saying that
From interviewing conducted after data collection in this 
study and in others I have formed the impressions that 
subjects will usually obscure from themselves the extent 
to which they regulate their responding so as to win 
favorable judgements from the experimenter [1969, p. 296].
While these two statements are based on different 
reasoning, Orne's suggesting a simple non-verbal process, 
and Rosenberg, I think, suggesting a more dynamically based 
process, both are consistent with the present research and 
with the studies of Bottom and Uleman, regarding the lack of 
subject reports of MC to be related to other components of 
awareness in a systematic manner.
The Controversy Regarding Awareness
In the present study, verbal reports of awareness 
accounted for almost twice as much variance (.401) in the 
dependent variable of conditioning than did all the manipula-
tions, including their interactions (.238). Certainly within 
this paradigm, at least, subjects are able to give more 
insight into their behavior than the experimental psycholo­
gist who might depend solely upon the effect of the indepen­
dent variable manipulations on overt conditioning. This 
finding supports the phenomenological viewpoint which sug­
gests that we might learn more about behavior simply by 
asking our subjects about relevant features of their experi­
ence .
However, the question of whether such awareness plays 
a mediational role in the production of conditioning is a 
more complicated issue, which no experiment, including the 
present, is able to answer conclusively, although a number of 
issues emerge from the data which have interesting implica­
tions.
A brief review of the controversy will help clarify 
these. Recall that the extreme cognitive position suggests 
that subjects approach the conditioning situation with a 
problem solving set, entertain and discard various hypotheses 
regarding the contingencies of reinforcement, and decide 
whether or not to cooperate with the demand characteristics 
of the experiment. This viewpoint places awareness of the 
features of the experiment, such as the contingencies and the 
experimenter's expectations, in a central role of mediating 
the effects of stimuli on the resulting behavior.
The descriptive behavioristic position, on the other 
hand, maintains that awareness, even if it is demonstrated,
plays no causal role in the conditioning effect. There are 
several variations on this position as outlined by Spiel- 
berger and DeNike (1966). The first is that awareness is 
suggested by the interviewing procedures, the second is that 
it is an artifact of labeling the conditioning effect which 
the subject notices, and a third suggests that both aware­
ness and conditioning are simultaneous effects of the con­
tingencies, the awareness merely being a verbal variation of 
the response.
Past research has been designed to differentiate 
between these explanations, particularly within the verbal- 
conditioning paradigm where the issue first came into focus 
when Greenspoon and Taffel concluded that conditioning with­
out awareness took place in their original studies. The 
verbal-conditioning paradigm is particularly well suited 
to speak to the third explanation of joint conditioning 
because the behavioral responses involve a temporal dimension 
in which the occurrence of awareness can be compared to the 
occurrence of the conditioned response. When such trend 
analysis has been performed, what has typically been found 
is sharp increments in performance following immediately after 
the inception of awareness, rather than gradual increments in 
both, which the jointconditioning model would predict 
(Spielberger, 1962).
The classical-conditioning paradigm is well suited 
for speaking to the labeling explanation, since unlike the
verbal-conditioning paradigm, the classical-conditioning 
paradigm uses a single response on the part of the subject 
which can be collected before or after the awareness mea­
sures. When this has been done, the pre-post factor has 
repeatedly shown no effect (Bottom, 1 972; Weber &, Riddell, 
1972). This suggests that it is unlikely that the awareness 
reports are merely labels which subjects give to describe 
the change in behavior which they notice from the dependent 
variable.
The notion that awareness is suggested by the inter­
viewing techniques designed to assess it has also received 
some empirical attention within both paradigms. Within the 
classical-conditioning one, a comparison of questionnaire for­
mats by Weber and Riddell (1973) elucidated the incidences 
of awareness assessed by direct questioning versus funnel 
technique, that is, the employment of general questions fol­
lowed by specific items to assess awareness. Their results 
did not support 5taats' claim (1969) that the funnel tech­
nique produces awareness, in that the presence of the general 
questions did not enhance the incidence of awareness. These 
global items, which had been previously used by themselves 
to define awareness (5taats &, Staats, 1 957) were shown to 
be deficient in that more awareness was detected with the 
specific items, and specifically measured awareness closely 
predicted actual conditioning. In fact, no evidence for con­
ditioning was found when aware subjects from the specific 
items were removed from the analysis.
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Evidence concerning the verbal-conditioning paradigm 
also supports the view that awareness is not necessarily an 
artifact of interviewing technique. Specifically, Klein and 
Weiner (1966) assessed awareness after a Taffel task with a 
"Visual Recognition Threshold Test" in which subjects were 
to read successfully clearer carbon copies of the critical 
contingencies, and awareness was measured through the number 
of copies necessary to read the contingency sentence correctly. 
This method of assessment prevented suggestion, and still, 
subjects with higher awareness levels conditioned, while low 
aware subjects did not.
These studies, while not proving the mediational role 
of awareness, do converge to suggest that the various 
behavioristic explanations are not supported by empirical 
evidence from both paradigms.
It is not the author's intention to suggest that 
awareness is always essential for performance and learning to 
take place, for common sense generates numerous examples in 
which habits are maintained without the presence of awareness. 
Further, with regard to the issue of learning without aware­
ness, Kimble (1962) cites some extreme examples, such as the 
classical conditioning of intestinal cells to the administration 
of salt solutions, as well as the conditioning of the eyeblink 
response, in which learning is not dependent upon the correct 
verbalization of the C5-UC5 relationships. However, it does 
seem plausible that in the classical conditioning of attitudes 
paradigm used in this study, awareness plays a central role in
the production of the effect. This evidence comes from the 
repeated demonstration of no learning without awareness (Page, 
1969; Weber & Riddell, 1972, as well as the present data).
The intuitive appeal of this rests on the nature of the 
stimulus situation and conditioned response: a highly unique
set of contingencies shaping a written response which cer­
tainly involves the use of striated muscles.
With regard to the causal role of awareness, however, 
the issue is still unresolved. Gross analysis of selected 
groups of hypothesis aware and unaware subjects, suggests 
that a knowledge of the experimenter's expectations is neces­
sary for the conditioning effect, as well as for the effect 
of evaluation cues on resulting behavior. However, the series 
of partial correlation predictions derived from the Dulaney 
model did not enable conclusions with regard to the causal 
effects of these components. This was due largely to the 
severe problems in measuring motivation to comply. However, 
predictions from the Dulaney model which did not involve the 
MC term also failed to be supported. That is, conditioning 
should have been more highly related to hypothesis awareness 
than to contingency awareness, which it was not.
□ne problem with research designed to test this model 
involves the fact that the components are difficult to mea­
sure, and so non-supportive findings are often dismissed as 
measurement problems, and the legitimacy of the model is 
retained. However, the present research has shown non-support, 
even though some of the predictions involve terms which have
been subjected to substantial validation testing. In this 
context, the present findings suggest that the model may 
need revision. It is the author's opinion that behavior in 
the present paradigm is an example of operant, rather than 
classical conditioning, and that awareness of the contingencies 
is important for the production of the critical response. 
However, the Dulaney model has not functioned to support this 
perspective in the present case, and it may be that the pre­
cise role of awareness is much more difficult than the model 
allows.
Indeed, Page (1973) and others (Doctor, 1971, Green- 
spoon &. Brownstein, 1 967; Goldstein et al. , 1 972) have pointed 
out it is difficult, if not impossible, to design a study 
which critically tests the question of whether awareness is 
necessary for conditioning. What is appropriate, instead, 
is a series of observations which make either explanation 
less and less plausible. The present study serves this pur­
pose. Even though the Dulaney model was not supported, sub­
jects who showed no hypothesis awareness did not condition, 
in line with a series of studies which have reported this 
finding (Page, 1 973 ; Weber &. Riddell, 1 973; Hare, 1 964).
Further, hypothesis awareness served as a critical mediator 
for the effects of evaluation cues on conditioning. Past 
.studies have shown that manipulations which detract from 
hypothesis awareness reduce conditioning (Page, 1969) with 
the use of filler items to make hypothesis awareness more 
difficult; the use of naive introductory students who are less
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familiar with the concept of conditioning). The present 
study speaks to the opposite effect, that is, enhancing 
hypothesis awareness through the explicit delineation of con­
tingency information increased conditioning. In addition,
Page (1973) has made a similar observation by enhancing 
hypothesis awareness through instructing the subjects to 
look for consistent patterns between the nonsense syllables 
and meaningful words. Thus, the present study fits within a 
larger body of research which suggests that hypothesis aware­
ness is essential for the production of the conditioning effect 
in this particular paradigm. While it is not possible to 
unequivocally rule out the behavioristic explanation, it 
becomes more and more difficult for the role of awareness to 
be discounted as such research accumulates.
Current Status of Subject Roles and 
Their Implications
In what manner has the current research contributed 
to our understanding of subject motivation in the laboratory?
Up to now, both experimental and observational evi­
dence seemed to favor the apprehensive role as the predomi­
nant subject motive, and the good subject as merely a facet 
of apprehension. This resulted from an extensive review of 
subject-role literature (Weber &. Cook, 1 972) as well as 
laboratory studies designed to pit the roles against each 
other (Sigall, et al. . Geller &. Endler, 1 973). However, lack 
of adequate manipulation checks and other design problems
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showed that these conclusions were unwarranted.
The current study employed extensive manipulation 
checks and found cooperation and apprehension both operative, 
and that it is not viable to reduce one role to the opera­
tion of the other, as Weber and Cook tentatively suggested. 
Contingency information clearly enhanced conditioning, 
although it did not seem to affect evaluation awareness, and 
over all subjects, contingency and hypothesis awareness 
showed no relationship to evaluation awareness. The fact 
that cooperation varied when apprehension was constant makes 
it inappropriate to explain cooperation solely with recourse 
to the concept of evaluation apprehension. Even more impor­
tant, given the complex ways in which situational and person 
variables interacted in the present study, the notion of 
"role" is misleading in the first place. Cooperation and 
resistance are neither characteristics of subjects or of situ­
ational demands, but instead a function of the interplay between 
both.
The present study also helps to resolve a previously 
posed question regarding the specific way in which evaluation 
apprehension mediates compliance with demand characteristics. 
Previous research on the effects of apprehension with regard 
to the experimenter expectancy effect (EEE) (Duncan, Starkey, 
Rosenberg, &. Finkelstein, 1 968) has shown that voice quality 
cues were effective in producing the effect, except when 
evaluation awareness was explicitly decreased. When appre­
hension was enhanced through cues, or left at its normal
level, the EEE was demonstrated. However, as the authors 
point out, the data did not permit them to distinguish whe­
ther the apprehension operated to help the subjects discern 
the demands, or whether it operated after that to induce 
motivation to comply with them. While there are striking 
differences between their Picture Rating paradigm and the 
classical conditioning one usedin the present study, the 
fact that in the present case evaluation cues did not increase 
either contingency or hypothesis awareness suggests that the 
second interpretation may be the most appropriate.
While the effects of the evaluation and hypothesis 
cues were orthogonal with respect to awareness, the eventual 
way in which they influence cooperation appeared to be inter­
active. That is, which "role," cooperation or apprehension, 
was elicited, depended upon the specific combination bT’cTTes 
in the experimental situation, as well as upon the subjects' 
need for approval. It was not possible to specify the 
effects of one cue without determining the levels of the 
other factors. Hypothesis cues were centrally important, in 
that they were responsible for the conditioning, and also 
necessary for the effectiveness of the evaluation cues.
This series of findings suggests that both Drne and 
Rosenberg are speaking of valid subject concerns, and that 
the extent to which either is elicited depends upon the 
particular experimental situation as well as the particular 
subjects. In this regard, it is less meaningful to ask which 
"role" is more important, than to specify the specific experi­
mental procedures which would give rise to either role and 
the specific people in our studies. To the extent that the 
classical conditioning of attitudes paradigm employs procedures 
which are not generalizable to other paradigms, conclusions 
from the present study are limited, in that a key implication 
from this research is that roles are situationally and 
person specific. In what way, then, has the current research 
contributed to the question of how to conduct methodologically 
sound research in other paradigms which take into account the 
importance of these very real subject motives?
First, with regard to specific cues used in the pre­
sent research, the effects of the personality test and prior 
information communicated by the accomplice suggests that 
experimenters should take great care to reduce evaluation cues 
of these sorts. If tests are a feature of the research, they 
should be administered at a different time and setting than 
the collection of the experimental data. Experimenters 
should take care to reduce the possibility of subjects com­
municating the purpose of the research, even though this is 
at times difficult. One way to do this would be to debrief 
subjects all at once, in the manner of the present study.
All cues which suggest the hypothesis of the experiment, 
such as the title, introductory information, and experimental 
procedures, whould be examined for passible sources of 
hypothesis and evaluation cues. Research in which the 
dependent variable is collected away from the experimental 
setting, such as non-reactive measures in the field, or a
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change in experiments, would seem to be particularly useful.
At a minimum, experimenters should assess the impact 
of any demand characteristics by assessing in detail post- 
experimental awareness, since such reports repeatedly show 
utility in the exploration of subject cooperation. The pre­
sent study indicates that it is possible to measure these 
components of awareness with varying degrees of success.
Null findings with the motivation to comply measures from 
this research, as well as from other studies, indicate that 
it may be difficult if not impossible to gain much from sub­
jects' reports of compliance. A recent paper by Insko and 
Cialdini (1971) suggests this may be because compliance in 
social influence situations is a much more common habit than 
is the recognition of contingencies and procedures in the 
experimental laboratory. For this reason, it seems likely 
that hypothesis and evaluation awareness would be more firmly 
anchored to verbal behavior than would measures of motivation 
to comply.
However, the present study has gone further in 
developing and validating a measure of evaluation awareness 
than previous research. In this respect it supports Alexander 
and Knight's (1971) demonstration that subjects act in line 
with "situated identities," that is, favorable character 
inferences, but it suggests that a more meaningful way to 
measure such awareness may be through the use of open-ended 
essay questions rather than through the use of semantic 
differential type attributions.
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In any case, since reports of awareness showed twice 
as much relationship to the dependent variable than did all 
the manipulations and their interactions, it is evident that 
subject awareness data are useful to the better understanding 
of behavior in this paradigm. It seems reasonable that this 
would be the case across a wide number of other paradigms, 
even though the specific relationships between situational 
cues and subject cooperation would be expected to change with 
a change in procedural cues. This research has underscored 
the view of the human subject as an active problem solver 
whose behavior is monitored on the basis of various types of 
demand characteristics. Certainly, as Qrne (1969) suggests 
with his notion of quasi-controls, behavior which is uncorre­
lated with reports of key hypotheses would be much less 
likely to be a product of subject cooperation.
Reports of awareness also serve the crucial need for 
manipulation checks of independent variables. While such 
checks have been recommended in the past, particularly for 
investigations of more molar variables such as those within 
social psychology , the dearth of such checks within the 
context of subject-role investigations is truly astonishing.
Thus another series of recommendations derived from 
this research related not so much to the content of the 
findings, but to the approach taken to the questions. That 
is, the triangulation of observations on a phenomenon is the 
essential logic and strategy of construct validity (Cronbach 
&. Meehl, 1 955) and upon which all psychological laws will
eventually rest. The investigation of various relation­
ships between data patterns within a single study such as 
the present would seem to be particularly useful, since dif­
ferences in laboratories and paradigms can be ruled out as 
explanations for any incongruencies in findings, providing a 
more complete test of the processes under investigation.
The findings concerning the individual difference measure of 
Social Desirability is a case in point.
This measure was chosen because it was conceptualized 
as an indication of a chronic variable, analagous to the acute 
manipulation of evaluation apprehension by the evaluation 
cues. Chronic variables indicate natural levels of a con­
struct which exist without manipulation, whereas acute levels 
are induced through experimental manipulations (see McGuire,
1968). The same disadvantages of each type of variable exist 
as with the experimental and correlational approaches, that 
is, the use of chronic variables risks confounding through 
subject self-selection, and the use of acute variables risks 
confounding through the artificiality of manipulation. When 
predictions fail to be supported it could be because of either 
of these inherent problems.
However, by combining both chronic and acute approaches 
within the same study, it is possible to maximize information 
output by converging observations. This was the intent behind 
the use of the 5D measure in concert with the evaluation cue 
manipulations.
1 48
The fact that the 5D measure functioned in the hypothe­
sized manner with evaluation cues in the present study is 
inspiring, although the lack of its power to produce signifi­
cant simple effects calls for further research. Two sugges­
tions have already been made--trichotimization and running 
subjects individually.
The 5D measure was chosen because it was the closest 
measure of the evaluation apprhension construct, and it had 
the most construct validity evidence behind it. However, 
it would seem to be measuring an extremely general trait, 
i.e., the propensity to be socially influenced, while a more 
specific trait might be far more predictive of cooperation 
in an experiment. In this regard, a measure of subject 
attitudes about the specific situation, i.e., the psychologi­
cal experiment, might be far more predictive. Past research 
with volunteers versus non-volunteers (Rosenthal &. Rosnow,
1969) indicates that the degree to which subjects willingly 
engage in experiments affects their behavior. Other research 
(Nottingham, 1972; Gustav, 1962; Straits, Wiebeen and Teho- 
phile, 1972) show that prior attitudes of subjects about 
experiments affect their behavior. Perhaps a measure of pre- 
experimental attitudes would have functioned more effectively 
in place of the 5D scale.
It is interesting to note that recent attempts by 
Adair have been directed toward this end. His "Psychological 
Research 5urvey" which consists of 52 statements of various 
attitudes toward experiments, psychologists and science,
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was found (over a series of studies) to predict conditioning 
in the verbal operant paradigm, as well as greater attitude 
change and conformity (Adair, 1970a, b; 1972; Adair &. Fenton, 
1972). However, at present, the scale is very heterogeneous 
in content, and it has not been possible, due to lack of 
adequate experimental assessment, to decipher whether the 
incoming attitudes affect motivation to comply with demands, 
or the original perception of them, as Adair has maintained. 
Given the preliminary positive findings, it would seem that 
an appropriate next step in the investigation would be to 
factor analyze the scale, and relate specific factors to 
the incidences of awareness and cooperation. In this 
manner, it would be possible to develop individual difference 
measures which might more powerfully predict differences 
in perceptual and cooperative processes among different 
types of subjects, and which could then be used for other 
research paradigms.
In a more general sense, the key to understanding the 
role of subject motivation will ultimately rest on the 
formulation of adequate theory which would take into account 
the various known sources of contamination and tie them to 
a few mediating constructs. Researchers could then design 
studies which control for the occurrences of these constructs. 
An interesting start in this direction has recently been 
made by Rosnow and Aiken (1973).
Using a combination of role theory and McGuire's 
social influence theory (1968; 1969), they postulate that
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subjects, like other socialized human beings, are susceptible 
to demands created by others. Like the hat-check girl who 
leaves two quarters in her basket knows (Page, 1973), people 
don't have to be literally told of these demands. The 
demands are discerned through various situations, as a result 
of consistency in the social order. One of these situations 
occurs within the psychological laboratory, where, as in 
other social influence situations, people are susceptible to 
the extent that these demands are communicated and they yield 
to them. Thus, factors which enhance receptivity, such as 
the EEE, titles of experiments, curious machinery, etc., 
and those which affect acquiescence, such as volunteer status, 
evaluation apprehension, and reactance, are effective in pro­
ducing laboratory artifacts because they affect these mediators. 
Researchers can design valid research to the extent that they 
skirt these mediators entirely, as in non-laboratory research, 
or manipulate the mediators and show that they do not affect 
the dependent variable, (as in triangulation and replication 
over irrelevant variables; Campbell &. Fiske, 1 959; Brunswik,
1 947).
Thus, the social psychological features of the 
laboratory are simply specific cases of the determinants of 
social behavior in general. To the extent that antecedents 
of such phenomena as conformity, compliance, ingratiation, 
reactance, and impression management are linked to the phe­
nomena up to now labeled "demand characteristics" and
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"evaluation apprehension," artifacts will be easier to specify 
and research findings will become generally more interpretable.
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Personality Test Instructions 
Before you is a personality test. Personality tests 
of this sort can't measure all of a person's personality, of 
course, but they do tap a specific aspect of psychological 
functioning in a systematic way. Please be careful and 
honest when filling this out. Beside each item, place a 
T if you basically agree with its content, or an F if you 
basically disagree. For items which are difficult to answer, 
put the answer which first occurs to you. If you have any 
questions, please ask the experimenter now.
General Instructions 
This is a study of intermodality learning. It 
involves the association of visual and auditory information, 
that is, the association of information you receive through 
your eyes and the information you receive through your ears. 
The visual information will consist of nonsense syllables 
which I will flash up on the screen in front of you. The 
auditory information will be words which I will read as 
each syllable is flashed.
[Contingency Information spliced in here]:
It will become obvious after only a few of these 
pairings that two of the syllables flashed on the
screen will be special. They will be special because
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one of them, YDF [WUH every other condition] is always 
going to be paired with words of pleasant or positive 
meaning. Likewise, WUH [YOF every other conditon] 
is always going to be paired with words of unpleasant 
or negative meaning. The other three syllables are 
always going to be paired with words of neutral meaning. 
There are two tasks which I would like you to carry 
out. The first is to pay attention to the nonsense syllables 
which are flashed. The second is to repeat the word which
I say after I say it in a loud clear voice. For example,
the first pair will consist of the nonsense syllable LAJ 
which will be flashed on the screen while I say the word 
"with." Your job is to pay attention to the syllable on 
the screen, and at the same time to clearly repeat the 
word "with" together as a group, after I say it.
There are eighty pairings; this will take about five
minutes. If you have any questions, please ask the experi­
menter now.
Dependent Variable Instructions 
Please turn over the syllable booklet in front of 
you and clearly print your full name in the top right 
corner. In this booklet there are a number of nonsense 
syllables. Your task consists of two parts: first, rate
each syllable according to how pleasant or unpleasant you 
feel it is. A mark in the middle of the scale indicates 
no feeling or a completely neutral feeling. Please put 
your marks between the colons, rather than on the colons.
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Second, check each syllable as to whether you think it was 
presented in the part of the experiment just completed.
Even if you think a syllable wasn't presented, you should 
rate how pleasant it is anyway, so that when done, you will 
have checks and pleasantness ratings for each syllable. If 
you have any questions, please ask the experimenter now.
[Accomplice asked the question in the Accomplice 
conditions here]
Post-Experimental Questionnaire Instructions 
Even though the experimental aspects of this study 
are now over, a very important kind of information still 
remains to be gathered, and that is your experience of the 
experiment itself. This is, in fact, one of the most 
important aspects of this research. Actually, this research 
is probably different from others that you might participate 
in, in that here, it is extremely important that we know 
how you, as a subject, interpreted the situation, Most 
experimenters merely gather the measures, and send you on 
your way, never giving you a chance to tell what you think 
was going on. So would you please be as conscientious 
and as truthful as possible when recalling your experience 
in the experiment itself.
There are some instructions which I would like to 
go over with you on this questionnaire. Please follow 
along with me. Number one: please answer the items in
the order in which they appear. Do not go back and change 
answers. If a new idea occurs to you which would lead you
to want to change one of your answers, jot the new thought 
down as soon as you think of it. Number two: Make sure you
understand each question before you answer it. If something 
is not clear, be sure to ask the experimenter. Number three 
please be as honest and as conscientious as you can. There 
is just one more thing that I would like to add. Most 
of the time, subjects come into an experiment with a role 
they play. They are supposed to be passive and naive. 
However, I want you to respond to this questionnaire as if 
you are the expert which you really are. For when it comes 
to your experience, I am naive, and you know everything.
From this standpoint, I would like you to be active, 
rather than passive. If an idea occurs to you which is 
only indirectly related to the item you are answering, 
include it. Remember, any and all information which you 
can tell me about how you went through this experiment will 
really help me in this research. Thank you.
APPENDIX B
MARLOW-CROWNE SOCIAL DESIRABILITY 5CALE
_____ 1. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qual­
ifications of all the candidates.
_____ 2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help
someone in trouble.
_____ 3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my
work if I am not encouraged.
_____ 4. I have never intensely disliked anyone.
_____ 5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability
to succeed in life.
_____ 6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way.
_____ 7. I am always careful about my manner of dress.
_____ 8. My table manners at home are as good as when I
eat out in a restaurant.
_____ 9. If I could get into a movie without paying and
be sure I was not seen I would probably do it.
_____ 10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing some­
thing because I though too little of my ability.
_____ 11. I like to gossip at times.
_____ 12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling
against people in authority even though I knew they were 
right.
_____ 13. No matter who I'm talking to, I am always a good
listener.
_____ 14. I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something.
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_____ 15. There have been occasions when I took advantage
of someone.
_____ 16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a
mistake.
_____ 17. I always try to practice what I preach.
_____ 18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get
along with loud mouthed, obnoxious people.
_____ 19. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive
and forget.
_____ 20. When I don't know something I don't at all mind
admitting it.
_____ 21. I am always courteous, even to people who are
disagreeable.
_____ 22. At times I have really insisted on having things
my own way.
_____ 23. There have been occasions when I felt like
smashing things.
_____ 24. I would never think of letting someone else be
punished for my wrong doings.
_____ 25. I never resent being asked to return a favor.
_____ 26. I never have been irked when people expressed
ideas very different from my own.
_____ 27. I never make a long trip without checking the
safety of my car.
_____ 28. There have been times when I was quite jealous
of the good fortune of others.
_____ 29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell
1 74
someone off.
_____ 30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors
of me.
_____ 31. I have never felt that I was punished without
cause.
_____ 32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune
they only got what they deserved.
_____ 33. I have never deliberately said something to hurt
someone's feelings.
_____ 34. Sometimes I take a disappointment so keenly that
I can't put it out of my head.
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APPENDIX C 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 5YLLABLE BOOKLETS*
G I U
p l w i m t  :_____ :_____ :_____ s_____ :_____ :_____ =_____ : unpleasant
This syllable was _______  presented before
was not __
V E C
pleasant :_______ :_______ :_______ :_______ :_______ :_______ * : unpleasant




pleasant :_______ :____________  :___ :________:_______ : : unpleasant
This syllable was  presented before
was not _______
H U E
pleasant :_______ :________:_______ :________:________:--------: : unpleasant
This syllable was  presented before
was not ____
L A J
pleasant :_______ :________:_______ :_______ :_______ :________: : unpleasant





•_______ •________‘________’________'■  : : unpleasant
This syllable was  - presented before
was not
G A H
pleasant :_______ :_______ ; :________:_______ :________: : unpleasant
















H  U G
pleasant














pleasant ; :________•____ — *-------- '------- '---------— -----
This syllable w a s  presented before
was not _______
W U H
• : : unpleasant
pleasant :_________________  *--------'-------------  “
This syllable was ________ presented before
was not _______
X A D
; : : unpleasant
pleasant :________  •_______ *--------•   —  —





. . ; unpleasant
pleasant :  •----■— *— ------ -------- -------- --
This syllable w a s ________ presented before










_____ 1. I often find myself going along with a group even
though I privately do not agree with them.
_____ 2. Before I vote on an issue, I like to consult my
friends and people I respect to make sure my opinions are 
not too contrary to theirs.
_____ 3. I dread door-to-door salesmen because I'm gullible
and can't say "no".
_____ 4. I am more cooperative and persuadable than most
people I know.
_____ 5. I find it very uncomfortable to be in disagreement
with anyone.
_____ 6. I am easily influenced.
_____ 7. I would rather change my mind on an issue than
be the only person in the group to take a different 
stand.
_____ 8. I often worry about strangers looking at me
and laughing at something I am wearing.
_____ 9. I try to keep up with the latest fashions.
_____ 10. Its important to be in the "in crowd".
_____ 11. I worry about having offended people accidently.
_____ 12. I often find that I am easily persuaded by
an arguement which I later find is not weel founded.
_____ 13. I have had some people tell me that I am too
gullible.
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_____ 14. I always try to cooperate with other people's
requests.
_____ 15. I think its important not to "rock the boat."
_____ 16. The world would be a lot better off without
the irrational emphasis on individualism.
_____ 17. I like to follow instructions and to do what
is expected of me.
_____ IB. I think cooperation is more important than
individualism.
_____ 19. I suppose you could say that I am a conformist.
_____ 20. I like to tell other people the things they
like to hear, even if I privately do not agree with 
what I am saying.
APPENDIX E
POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE
Please follow these instructions very carefully when 
filling this out— remember, this is a most essential 
part of this research.
1. Answer the items in the order in which they 
appear. Do NOT go back and change answers. If a new 
idea occurs to you which would lead you to want to 
change one of your answers, jot the new thought down 
as soon as you think of it.
2. Make sure you understand each question before 
you answer it. If something is not clear, be sure to 
ask the experimenter.
3. Please be as honest and as conscientious as you
can .
1. How valuable do you think this experiment is 
scientifically?





6. Don’t have any idea
Why?
2. How interesting did you find this experiment?





3. Would you say that how a person rated the syllables 






[This page included in Test conditions only]
4. What was the purpose of the personality test 
given at the beginning of the experiment?
5. What specific aspect of personality did the test 
measure?
6. What nonsense syllable was always or usually paired 
with spoken words of pleasant or positive meaning?
7. What nonsense syllable was always or usually 
paired with spoken words of unplesant or negative 
meaning?
B. How do you think the experimenter expected people 
to rate YOF?
Pleasant:_____ :______:______:_____ :______:______:______; Unpleasant




10. If a person rated the nonsense syllables WUH and 
YOF according to the pleasant or unpleasant words they 
were paired with, would this indicate anything about 
his personality or intelligence? (Check one)
_A. No, I do not think that how a person rated WUH
and YOFand WUH in this experiment would have anything 
at all to do with either his personality or intelligence.
_B. There may or may not be some relationship
between the way a person rated WUH and YOF in this 
experiment and his personality or intelligence, but 
if there is, I do not know what it would be.
_____ C. Yes, I think there is some relationship between
a person's rating of YOF and WUH in this experiment 
and his personality or intelligence, but I don't know 
what it is.
_____ D. Yes, I think there is some relationship between
a person's ratings of YOF and WUH in this experiment 
and his personality or intelligence, and I might know 
what it is.
_____ E. Yes, I think there is some relationship between
a person's ratings of YOF and WUH in this experiment 
and his personality or intelligence, and I think I know 
what it is.
_____ F. Yes, I think there is some relationship between
a person's ratings of YOF and WUH in this experiment 
and his personality or intelligence, and I definately 
know what it is.
11. If a person rated the nonsense syllables WUH 
and YOF according to the pleasant or unpleasant words 
they were paired with, what would this indicate about 
his personality or intelligence?
12. If a person did not rate the nonsense syllables 
WUH and YOF according to the pleasant or unpleasant 
words they were paired with, what would this indicate 
about his personality or intelligence?
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13. On the following dimensions, give your impressions 
of the typical person who would rate the syllables YOF 
and WUH according to the positive or negative words 

























14. During the experiment, did you want to rate the 
syllables the way you thought the experimenter expected 
you to?
Wanted to Very much
very much:_____ :______:______:______:______:______: :did not
Somewhat
did
Didn't care Somewhat 
did not
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15. In this type of study, some people are influenced 
by knowing the experimenter's expectations to report 
perhaps a little more feeling about the syllables 
than they actually experienced in order to "help" 
the hypothesis along. Others react by trying to act 
naturally and not "help" the hypothesis along. Still 
others react in a negativistic way and actually try to 
resist rating the syllables according to the hypothesis, 
sometimes even doing the opposite of what they think 
the experimenter is looking for. With this in mind, 
and its important to be honest at this point, how 
much did you try to help the hypothesis along by rating 
the syllables according to the way you thought you 
were supposed to?
Tried to Tried to do
very much:_____:______:_____ :______:_____ :______:______ :the opposit
Acted naturally
16. To what extent did you resist rating the syllables 
according to the experimenter's expectations in order
to avoid looking gullible or conforming?
Resisted very 
much: :
Did not resist 
: at all
17. Please write down any other comments which you feel 
might help us to understand your reaction to this experiment.
